Housing Affordability

Everett Gross: Explaining Rent

Sometimes it's difficult for people to understand the meaning of "rent" as an economic concept. One way I have of explaining it doesn't use the word rent. I just use a little analogy.

I'm from Crete, Nebraska. It's a small town of 5,000 people.

Suppose a man comes to Crete, and he wants to start a business. He needs a building, but first he needs a piece of ground to build this new building on. So he looks up a real estate agent, describes what he wants, and the real estate agent shows him a parcel that's just right for his needs. The man asks the agent, "All right, now how much money do you want for this land?" The agent says, "It's worth $50,000." The man says, "Why is it worth $50,000?" And the real estate agent points out that "The school is good, the roads are good, the police department is good, the rescue crew is good and very fast, and business is good here."

So the man says "Yeah, I believe that $50,0000 is a fair price. I'll take it. How do I pay the $50,000 to the school people, and the road people, and the police department? To whom do I pay the $50,000?" And the real estate agent says, "Oh no. You don't pay it to them. You pay it to the person who owned the land before."

The man says, "But who supports the schools, and the roads, and the police, and the other good things?" And the real estate agent says, "If you build, then you'll pay for them again."

The buyer then asks, "And what will the previous owner do for me for my $50,000?"  The real estate man answers, "Nothing!  Nothing at all!"

Now I don't need to use the word "rent" in that explanation.

H.G. Brown: Significant Paragraphs from Henry George's Progress & Poverty: 10. Effect of Remedy Upon Wealth Production (in the unabridged P&P: Part IX — Effects of the Remedy: Chapter 1 — Of the effect upon the production of wealth)

The elder Mirabeau, we are told, ranked the proposition of Quesnay, to substitute one single tax on rent (the impôt unique) for all other taxes, as a discovery equal in utility to the invention of writing or the substitution of the use of money for barter.

To whosoever will think over the matter, this saying will appear an evidence of penetration rather than of extravagance. The advantages which would be gained by substituting for the numerous taxes by which the public revenues are now raised, a single tax levied upon the value of land, will appear more and more important the more they are considered. ...

And will not the community gain by thus refusing to kill the goose that lays the golden eggs; by thus refraining from muzzling the ox that treadeth out the corn; by thus leaving to industry, and thrift, and skill, their natural reward, full and unimpaired? For there is to the community also a natural reward. The law of society is, each for all, as well as all for each. No one can keep to himself the good he may do, any more than he can keep the bad. Every productive enterprise, besides its return to those who undertake it, yields collateral advantages to others. If a man plant a fruit tree, his gain is that he gathers the fruit in its time and season. But in addition to his gain, there is a gain to the whole community. Others than the owner are benefited by the increased supply of fruit; the birds which it shelters fly far and wide; the rain which it helps to attract falls not alone on his field; and, even to the eye which rests upon it from a distance, it brings a sense of beauty. And so with everything else. The building of a house, a factory, a ship, or a railroad, benefits others besides those who get the direct profits.

Well may the community leave to the individual producer all that prompts him to exertion; well may it let the laborer have the full reward of his labor, and the capitalist the full return of his capital. For the more that labor and capital produce, the greater grows the common wealth in which all may share. And in the value or rent of land is this general gain expressed in a definite and concrete form. Here is a fund which the state may take while leaving to labor and capital their full reward. With increased activity of production this would commensurately increase.

And to shift the burden of taxation from production and exchange to the value or rent of land would not merely be to give new stimulus to the production of wealth; it would be to open new opportunities. For under this system no one would care to hold land unless to use it, and land now withheld from use would everywhere be thrown open to improvement.

The selling price of land would fall; land speculation would receive its death blow; land monopolization would no longer pay.* Millions and millions of acres from which settlers are now shut out by high prices would be abandoned by their present owners or sold to settlers upon nominal terms. And this not merely on the frontiers, but within what are now considered well settled districts.

* The fact that a tax on the rental value of land cannot be shifted by landowners to tenants, though recognized by all competent economists, is sometimes a stumbling block to persons untrained in economics. The reason such a tax cannot be shifted is that it cannot limit the supply of land. Landowners are presumably, before the tax is laid, charging all the rent they can get. There is nothing in a tax on the rental value of land to make tenants willing to pay more or to make land more difficult to hire. On the contrary, more land will be on the market, because of such a tax, rather than less, since the tax puts a heavy penalty on holding land out of use and unimproved for mere speculation. The competition of former vacant land speculators to get their land used will make land cheaper to rent rather than more expensive. And since only the net rent remaining after the tax is subtracted is capitalized into salable value, land will be very much cheaper to buy. H.G.B.

And it must be remembered that this would apply, not merely to agricultural land, but to all land. Mineral land would be thrown open to use, just as agricultural land; and in the heart of a city no one could afford to keep land from its most profitable use, or on the outskirts to demand more for it than the use to which it could at the time be put would warrant. Everywhere that land had attained a value, taxation, instead of operating, as now, as a fine upon improvement, would operate to force improvement. Whoever planted an orchard, or sowed a field, or built a house, or erected a manufactory, no matter how costly, would have no more to pay in taxes than if he kept so much land idle.

• The monopolist of agricultural land would be taxed as much as though his land were covered with houses and barns, with crops and with stock.
• The owner of a vacant city lot would have to pay as much for the privilege of keeping other people off of it until he wanted to use it, as his neighbor who has a fine house upon his lot.
• It would cost as much to keep a row of tumble-down shanties upon valuable land as though it were covered with a grand hotel or a pile of great warehouses filled with costly goods.

Thus, the bonus that wherever labor is most productive must now be paid before labor can be exerted would disappear.

• The farmer would not have to pay out half his means, or mortgage his labor for years, in order to obtain land to cultivate;
• the builder of a city homestead would not have to lay out as much for a small lot as for the house he puts upon it*;
• the company that proposed to erect a manufactory would not have to expend a great part of its capital for a site.
• And what would be paid from year to year to the state would be in lieu of all the taxes now levied upon improvements, machinery, and stock.

  *Many persons, and among them some professional economists, have never succeeded in getting a thorough comprehension of this point. Thus, the editor has heard the objection advanced that the greater cheapness of land is no advantage to the poor man who is trying to save enough from his earnings to buy a piece of land; for, it is said, the higher taxes on the land after it is acquired, offset the lower purchase price. What such objectors do not see is that even if the lower price of land does no more than balance the higher tax on it, (and this overlooks, for one thing, the discouragement to speculation in land), the reduction or removal of other taxes is all clear gain. It is easier to save in proportion as earnings and commodities are relieved of taxation. It is easier to buy land, because its selling price is lower, if the land is taxed. And although the land, after its purchase, continues to be taxed, not only can this tax be fully paid out of the annual interest on the saving in the purchase price, but also there is to be reckoned the saving in taxes on buildings and other improvements and in whatever other taxes are thus rendered unnecessary. H.G.B.... read the whole chapter

Louis Post: Outlines of Louis F. Post's Lectures, with Illustrative Notes and Charts (1894) — Appendix: FAQ

Q20. Would not the single tax increase the rent of houses?
A. No. It takes taxes off buildings and materials, thus making it cheaper to build houses. How can house rent go up as the cost of building houses goes down? Read pp. 5 to 8 and the related notes. ... read the book

Weld Carter: An Introduction to Henry George

John Dewey: Steps to Economic Recovery

Consequently instead of attempting a technical explanation of the moral and economic philosophy of Henry George, I want to urge my hearers to acquaint themselves with his own works, to study them and then to organize to see that his principle is carried into effect. What are the most evident sore spots of the present? The answer is clear. Unemployment; extreme inequality in the distribution of the national income; enormous fixed charges in the way of interest on debts; a crazy, cumbrous, inequitable tax system that puts the burden on the consumer, and the ultimate producer, and lets off the parasites, exploiters and the privileged, -- who ought to be relieved entirely of their gorged excess, -- very lightly, and indeed in many cases, as in that of the tariff, pays them a premium for imposing a burden on honest industry and on the means of production; a vicious and incompetent banking system, with billions of money, the hope for the future of millions of hard-working peoples, still locked up, while the depositors lose their homes and walk the streets in vain; the greater part of our population, in the nation of the earth most favored by nature, still living either in slums or in homes without the improvements indispensable to a healthy and civilized life.

You cannot study Henry George without learning how intimately each of these wrongs and evils is bound up with our land system. One of our great national weaknesses is speculation. Everybody recognizes that fact in the stock market orgy of our late boom days. Only a few realize the extent to which speculation in land is the source of many troubles of the farmer, the part it has played in loading banks and insurance companies with frozen assets and compelling the closing of thousands of banks, nor how the high rents, the unpayable mortgages and the slums of the cities are connected with speculation in land values. All authorities on public works hold that the most fruitful field for them is slum clearance and better housing. Yet only a few seem to realize that with our present situation this improvement will put a bonus in the pockets of landlords, and the land speculator will be the one to profit financially--for after all, buildings are built on land. ... read the whole speech

Upton Sinclair: The Consequences of Land Speculation are Tenantry and Debt on the Farms, and Slums and Luxury in the Cities

I know of a woman — I have never had the pleasure of making her acquaintance, because she lives in a lunatic asylum, which does not happen to be on my visiting list. This woman has been mentally incompetent from birth. She is well taken care of, because her father left her when he died the income of a large farm on the outskirts of a city. The city has since grown and the land is now worth, at conservative estimate, about twenty million dollars. It is covered with office buildings, and the greater part of the income, which cannot be spent by the woman, is piling up at compound interest. The woman enjoys good health, so she may be worth a hundred million dollars before she dies.

I choose this case because it is one about which there can be no disputing; this woman has never been able to do anything to earn that twenty million dollars. And if a visitor from Mars should come down to study the situation, which would he think was most insane, the unfortunate woman, or the society which compels thousands of people to wear themselves to death in order to pay her the income of twenty million dollars?

The fact that this woman is insane makes it easy to see that she is not entitled to the "unearned increment" of the land she owns. But how about all the other people who have bought up and are holding for speculation the most desirable land? The value of this land increases, not because of anything these owners do — not because of any useful service they render to the community — but purely because the community as a whole is crowding into that neighborhood and must have use of the land.

The speculator who bought this land thinks that he deserves the increase, because he guessed the fact that the city was going to grow that way. But it seems clear enough that his skill in guessing which way the community was going to grow, however useful that skill may be to himself, is not in any way useful to the community. The man may have planted trees, or built roads, and put in sidewalks and sewers; all that is useful work, and for that he should be paid. But should he be paid for guessing what the rest of us were going to need?

Before you answer, consider the consequences of this guessing game. The consequences of land speculation are tenantry and debt on the farms, and slums and luxury in the cities. A great part of the necessary land is held out of use, and so the value of all land continually increases, until the poor man can no longer own a home. The value of farm land also increases; so year by year more independent farmers are dispossessed, because they cannot pay interest on their mortgages. So the land becomes a place of serfdom, that land described by the poet, "where wealth accumulates and men decay." The great cities fill up with festering slums, and a small class of idle parasites are provided with enormous fortunes, which they do not have to earn, and which they cannot intelligently spend.

This condition wrecked every empire in the history of mankind, and it is wrecking modern civilization. One of the first to perceive this was Henry George, and he worked out the program known as the Single Tax. Let society as a whole take the full rental value of land, so that no one would any longer be able to hold land out of use. So the value of land would decrease, and everyone could have land, and the community would have a great income to be spent for social ends. ... read the whole article

Nic Tideman: The Case for Site Value Rating

Both for reasons of social justice and for reasons of economic efficiency, site value rating deserves a continued place in the programme of the Liberal Party.

The case for site value rating in terms of social justice is founded on two understandings: first, that the value of land in the absence of economic development is the common heritage of humanity, and second, that increases in the rental value of land arising from economic development and government expenditures should be collected by governments to finance those activities. What is meant by "land" is the unimproved value of sites and the value of extractable natural resources such as North Sea oil.

While there may someday be institutions capable of implementing a recognition of land as the heritage of all humanity on a worldwide basis, in the absence of such institutions each nation should implement a recognition that land within its boundaries is the common heritage of its citizens. This is accomplished not by making the nation a gigantic Common or by instituting government management of all land, but rather by requiring all persons and corporations that are granted the use of land to pay a fee or tax equal to what the rental value of the land they control would be if it were in an unimproved condition.

The case for site value rating in terms of economic efficiency is founded on the fact that a tax on resources that are not produced by human effort is one of the few sources of government revenue that does not reduce incentives for people to be productive. Two other revenue sources that have this virtue are taxes on other government-granted privileges such as exclusive use of radio frequencies and taxes on activities with harmful consequences, such as polluting the air. An economy will be more efficient if revenue sources that do not diminish productivity are employed to the greatest possible extent before any use is made of taxes that impede productivity.

What makes a tax efficient is that the amount of tax that is due cannot be reduced by reducing productive activities.

• When incomes are taxed, people can reduce the amount of taxes owed by working less. They do so, and the productivity of the economy falls. 
• When houses are taxed, people can reduce the amount of taxes owed by building fewer house and smaller houses. They do so, and the housing shortage worsens.
  
• But when the unimproved value of land is taxed, there is no resulting diminution in the quantity of land.

Subsequent sections explain in more detail these social justice and efficiency arguments for site value rating, describe procedures for implementing such a tax system, and explain why a variety of potential objections are without merit.

The Social Justice of Site Value Rating

In primitive societies, land is generally regarded as not ownable. No one made the land, so how can anyone own it? Ownership generally originates in conquest. In England, titles to land originated in the claim of William the Conqueror to own all the land because he was king. He granted to dukes, earls, etc. the right to collect rent from designated territories in exchange for their promises to fulfill various obligations to him. In the seventeenth century the nobility succeeded in removing all of their obligations to the crown, but they retained their rights to land. A substantial part of the great inequality in wealth in the United Kingdom can be traced to ancient patents of nobility that granted rights to collect rent.

But the very great increases of recent years, which have made it nearly impossible for young families to afford houses of their own, have additional causes. The implementation of our ideas would bring down the price of access to land in three ways.

• First, much land is held off the market by speculators who may wait generations do decide to develop it. The introduction of a fee for holding land, whether used or not, equal to the rental value of the land, will induce speculators to either develop this land themselves or turn it over to someone who will.
• Second, an important cause of higher prices for access to land by those who wish to build low-cost housing is zoning restrictions. These restrictions are introduced by political factions that already have their houses and do not mind if housing becomes scarcer. It just raises the market value of their homes. But if a rise in land values were accompanied by rises in the fees that existing residents had to pay for the use of the land on which their houses sit, they would have an incentive to do what they could to make land plentiful rather than scarce, and zoning restrictions could be expected to diminish.
• Third, a person who wishes to own a house must borrow money to cover the price of buying the title to the land on which the house sits as well as the cost of the house itself. If the use of land required the payment of a fee equal to the rental value of land, so that the selling price of land titles became virtually zero, then the amount of money that a family would have to borrow to purchase a house would fall. ...  Read the whole article

These "capital gains" for households are part of the new phenomenon that has been popularized as "labor capitalism." As Margaret Thatcher's crowd has put it, "Sorry you've lost your job; I hope you've made a killing on your Council House or home in the real estate market." The free lunch.

For the two-thirds of America's and Britain's populations who are home owners, this free lunch from asset-price inflation of land has proved to be a silver lining in the post-industrial economy. For the remaining third of the population, however, the price of access to home ownership is receding rapidly. Today it hardly is possible for most renters to earn the money to acquire their own homes. The entry price has been bid up too high by those hoping to gain from asset-price inflation even as labor's earnings have been declining.

Alanna Hartzok: Earth Rights Democracy: Public Finance based on Early Christian Teachings

Al Hartheimer: Affordable Housing and the Land Value Tax Perspective: a letter to Asheville, North Carolina

To make housing more affordable we advocate the reduction of the tax on buildings and a simultaneous rise of the tax on land to yield the same or more revenue. This is called Land Value Taxation. It is also called the two-rate tax, incentive taxation and the split-rate tax.

We know, from studies of the twenty Pennsylvania taxing jurisdictions that use LVT, that every time the tax on buildings is reduced, and simultaneously the tax on land is increased, that there is a spurt of construction. According to Plassmann and Tideman (A Markov Chain Monte Carlo Analysis of the Effects of Two-Rate Property Taxes in Pennsylvania, Florenz Plassmann and T. Nicholas Tideman, September 1997, p19), "This means that, for an average municipality, an increase in the adjusted tax differential of 1 mil will yield an expected increase in the total value of construction of 1.58%". Much of this increase in construction comes from people improving their homes with the knowledge that the penalty for making improvements is being reduced.

Does this provide more affordable housing? Pittsburgh has used the two-rate tax since 1915, 85 years. Recently, Lew Sichelman (The Housing Scene, by Lew Sichelman, the Los Angeles Times, Sunday, June 4, 2000) said "According to the federal government's latest tabulation, the average of both new and existing houses sold in 31 key markets nationwide reached $200,300 during the first three months of this year…. The San Francisco Bay Area…remains the most expensive place in the country in which to buy a house. The average price there is now $384,700. …At the other end of the price spectrum, the average remains under $150,000 in only two places: Pittsburgh at $143,300….and St. Louis at $145,100." So Pittsburgh, the only sizeable city in the United States to use the two-rate tax, has the lowest cost housing in the country. A coincidence? Perhaps not.

An interesting and amazing thing about the Pittsburgh experience is that the two-rate tax in Pittsburgh applies only to the city tax, not to the school tax and not to the county tax. It's impressive to say that for the city tax the tax rate on land is six times higher than the tax rate on buildings, but because of the much higher value of buildings, only about 57% of the city tax is from land. When you add the school tax and the county tax, less than 40% of the tax yield is from land.

So a modest land tax applied over a long time (85 years) results in the lowest average cost of housing in the country. Imagine what would happen if the tax on buildings were eliminated and all of the city revenue came from the land tax. It boggles the mind to think about it. ... read the entire article

William F. Buckley, Jr.: Home Dear Home

Henry George, the eminent social philosopher of a century ago, turned the attention of planners and economists, however briefly, to the indefeasible factor of land scarcity. Capital and labor can increase; land cannot.

Accordingly, George was the apostle of the single tax. It aimed most directly at land speculators. His insights would focus now on the limitations on the use of land imposed by zoning. If John Jones wants an acre protecting his house, he is laying claim to something that cannot expand in size. Since land, in George's analysis, is forever limited, it must be thought of and treated as common property. And therefore the rental value of one acre should constitute a tax (the single tax) on the person who sequesters it for himself.

A strong case can be made for the amenities of zoning laws. But they have an effect on the availability of housing, and on its cost. One result is that housing costs are increasing faster than inflation.

But is the Henry George factor likely to be espoused in political platforms? It cannot happen soon because too many interests are vested in zoning laws. But sharp political eyes should be trained on the question, in search of a viable formulation designed to fight against homelessness for grandchildren who cannot be expected to pay the projected cost of housing. ... read the whole column

Jeff Smith: Share Rent, Transform Society

It is not just collecting ground rent but also untaxing other systems. Untax labor and make it more affordable. Enterprises such as recycling and reforestation, weatherization, reconstruction, and health enterprises are labor intensive and made more expensive artificially by taxing labor. We subsidize business: free roads for the timber industry, cheap water for agribusiness. Stop those subsidies and recycling could compete.
 
On a level field, recycling would roll over extraction of virgin material. We could spare forests and salmon and have a healthier eco system. Look at restoration. Money has to come from the public treasury but we could look at it as public investment. Pay for restoration and land values increase, so land dividends would increase. Direct investment benefits the entire public.

Now the public is paying for private parties. That is not fair. Look at the economy. Take taxes off homes, and they become more affordable. Have some kind of land charge, and housing stock increases as sites get developed. Affordable housing helps stabilize neighborhoods. In places that do have the land tax, i.e., Australia and New Zealand, they have fewer disputes with assessment. Assessors say their job is so much easier now. If land is less profitable and less of a political football, it is less tense in local politics.  ... read the whole article

Mason Gaffney: How to Revive a Dying City

• Wages of general building construction workers rose 14 percent a year.
• Wages of special trade construction workers rose 11 percent a year.
• Construction material costs rose 11.5 percent a year.
• Combined wage-materials-managerial costs for residential building rose 12.5 percent a year.
• Fuel and utility costs for housing rose 13.8 percent a year. All of these costs closely tracked the Consumer Price Index which, over these same 30 years, rose by 12 percent a year. According to those figures, housing prices and housing rents apparently were held in check

• How to explain that, during the last decade of my research period, U.S. households with serious housing problems increased from 19 to 24 millions?
• What caused the portion of renters paying more than 35 percent of their income for housing doubled from 21 to 41 percent during the last two decades of the study period?
• Why were over 2.4 million renters paying 60 percent or more of their income for rent?

• One, by deflating land costs it will enable the private market to offer homes and sites at lower costs.
• Two, this will shrink the number of families needing subsidies.
• Three, it will stretch subsidy dollars farther because sites for publicly assisted housing can be acquired far more cheaply.

• the average rental rose from $71.13 per month to $186.79 or by 160%.
• During the same period median urban family income rose from $3,497 to $5,924 or by only 69%. 
• Construction costs per square foot rose from $8.68 in 1950 to $11.32 in 1961 or by only 30.4%.

• We have found that a high and burdensome tax rate on improvements will discourage residential construction, create unemployment, penalize home-ownership, aggravate the housing shortage and force up rents.
• Yet a low tax rate on land will have similar if not identical effects: it will lead to a rise in urban land values, which in turn will discourage residential construction, create unemployment, penalize home-ownership, aggravate the housing shortage and force up rents.

Henry Ford Talks About War and Your Future - 1942 interview

Frank Stilwell and Kirrily Jordan: The Political Economy of Land: Putting Henry George in His Place

Land is the most basic of all economic resources, fundamental to the form that economic development takes. Its use for agricultural purposes is integral to the production of the means of our subsistence. Its use in an urban context is crucial in shaping how effectively cities function and who gets the principal benefits from urban economic growth. Its ownership is a major determinant of the degree of economic inequality: surges of land prices, such as have occurred in Australian cities during the last decade, cause major redistributions of wealth. In both an urban and rural context the use of land – and nature more generally – is central to the possibility of ecological sustainability. Contemporary social concerns about problems of housing affordability and environmental quality necessarily focus our attention on ‘the land question.’ ...

While still ignored by the economic orthodoxy, interest in George’s work has been stimulated by modern concerns about housing affordability and environmental decay. Such revival of interest recognises that these problems stem, in part, from inadequate policies relating to land. Some members of Green parties, in particular, have embraced Georgist ideas. ...

A third aspect in this ‘stocktaking’ of the relevance of Georgist analysis and policy to contemporary political economic conditions concerns the persistent problems of housing affordability. The difficulty of purchasing, or renting, affordable housing has reached social crisis proportions in many large cities around the world. In Sydney, for example, a median-priced house could be bought for just under four years of average Australian earnings in 1986, but an equivalent house in 2003 cost over twelve years’ worth of earnings (Stilwell, 2003). This constitutes an enormous barrier to home-ownership for a younger generation, a problem that both Federal and State Governments have sought to redress by the provision of first home-buyers’ subsidies. It is not typically the house itself that has been the cause of the inflation, but the price of the land on which it stands. So, looking at the situation from a Georgist perspective immediately directs our attention to how the demand and supply of land affects housing affordability.

The demand for land involves both use values and exchange values. People seek land because the housing built on it provides shelter and security, but they also purchase it as a store of wealth and a means of capital appreciation. A particularly important driver of real estate prices has been the speculative demand, as investors seek capital gains in the property market. In Australia, this has been such common and longstanding practice that it has been referred to as ‘the national hobby’ (Sandercock, 1979). By ‘creaming off’ a part of this potential capital gain, a higher uniform rate of land tax would act as a disincentive to this property speculation, and could therefore be expected to exert a downward influence on property prices. Georgists have always been emphatic that land taxes are different from other taxes in this respect – they depress prices because they reduce demand. So the usual fears that a tax will be ‘passed on’ to customers (such as housing tenants, in this case) do not apply. By making land less attractive as an item to be purchased in the hope of making capital gains, land tax can therefore be an important check on the inflationary process.

However, while a higher uniform land tax could be an important component in a policy addressing housing affordability, it seems unlikely to provide a complete solution. The severity of the housing problem in Australia, for example, also derives partly from the dwindling supply of public housing. Public housing is now less than 5% of the total housing stock and falling (National Housing Alliance, 2004: 5). Governments have withdrawn funds from public housing and tightened entry requirements (for example, lowering the threshold for the means test). This has caused public housing waiting lists to lengthen and put greater pressure on the private rental sector. More and more people have been forced into circumstances of significant ‘housing stress,’ paying a third or more of their net income for housing (Hawtrey, 2002), and further adding to inflationary pressures on housing prices.

There is a potentially important link between these concerns – land tax and public housing – because a higher, more uniform land tax could generate revenue to finance a significantly larger public housing sector. That would, in effect, kill two birds with one stone, providing the twin basis for an assault on the problem of housing affordability. ... read the whole article