Land
Value Mapping
Mason Gaffney: Nonpoint
Pollution: Tractable Solutions to Intractable Problems
The Special Challenge to
Economic Thinking
The Search for Surrogates
Sources of Nonpoint Pollution
What Problems are Created?
What Problems are Unsolved by Excise Taxes on Surrogates?
The Case of Forestry
The Case of Urban Settlement
The Case of Agriculture
The Common Theme from Forest, City and Farm
Solutions
But the profile of land values is like a volcanic island.
To raise the top and the slopes and the shores we must also raise the
shallows above sea level, where they shed the waters and come into
use.
Rising population is one factor pushing up the profile of
values, but not the strongest one. Increased demand per capita is
the main factor. These demands include all the spurious demands
described above, like the demand of government for land to "bank" and
hold idle, and the demand of speculators "with a view to getting a
little something for nothing." ... Read the whole article
Fred E. Foldvary — The
Ultimate Tax Reform: Public Revenue from Land Rent
Land value taxation taps the geo-rent. Like today’s real property
tax, a land value tax would have some tax rate that would tap some percentage
of
the land value or rent. I suggest 80 percent of the geo-rent be used for
public revenue. The landowner would pay it from the rental he collects from
the tenant,
or if owner-occupied, from the implicit rental value he obtains from the
site. The 80 percent rate would leave some of the land rent with the landowner
to
have a margin for assessment error and also to maintain a positive price
for the land to facilitate its sale.
There are several methods of assessing land value or rent. One way is to calculate
the replacement value of the existing improvements (unless they are historic),
and then subtract the depreciation of the buildings. Then subtract the building
value from the total property value. What is left is land value. For commercial
property, one also can take the net income and subtract the return on the improvements
(using some interest rate), the remainder being land rent. In some places there
is vacant or bare land that has a market price, and sometimes there are separate
owners for the land and the improvements, for which data can be derived from
leases and sales. The assessors then smooth out the neighborhood land values,
using computerized maps. It is not necessary to individually assess the values
of most of the buildings in a neighborhood, since most lots in a locality will
have a similar value per lot.
Assessors enter this data into computers, which generate neighborhood
maps. The assessors interpolate or smooth out the prices of lots between
those for
which they have recent sales or rental data, since land values tend to
be similar in a neighborhood unless there is some special feature such
as corner lots
or odd-sized lots. ... read the whole document
Louis Post: Outlines of Louis F. Post's
Lectures, with Illustrative Notes and Charts (1894)
d. Effect of Confiscating Rent to Private Use.
By giving Rent to individuals society ignores this most just law, 99 thereby
creating social disorder and inviting social disease. Upon society alone,
therefore, and not upon divine Providence which has provided bountifully,
nor upon the disinherited poor, rests the responsibility for poverty and
fear of poverty.
99. "Whatever dispute arouses the passions of men,
the conflict is sure to rage, not so much as to the question 'Is it wise?'
as to the question 'Is it right?'
"This tendency of popular discussions to take an
ethical form has a cause. It springs from a law of the human mind; it
rests upon a vague and instinctive recognition of what is probably the
deepest truth we can grasp. That alone is wise which is just; that alone
is enduring which is right. In the narrow scale of individual actions
and individual life this truth may be often obscured, but in the wider
field of national life it everywhere stands out.
"I bow to this arbitrament, and accept this test." — Progress
and Poverty, book vii, ch. i.
The reader who has been deceived into believing that Mr.
George's proposition is in any respect unjust, will find profit in a
perusal of the entire chapter from which the foregoing extract is taken.
Let us try to trace the connection by means of a chart, beginning with the
white spaces on page 68. As before, the first-comers take possession of the
best land. But instead of leaving for others what they do not themselves
need for use, as in the previous illustrations, they appropriate the whole
space, using only part, but claiming ownership of the rest. We may distinguish
the used part with red color, and that which is appropriated without use
with blue. Thus: [chart]
But what motive is there for appropriating more of the space than is used?
Simply that the appropriators may secure the pecuniary benefit of future
social growth. What will enable them to secure that? Our system of confiscating
Rent from the community that earns it, and giving it to land-owners who,
as such, earn nothing.100
100. It is reported from Iowa that a few years ago a workman
in that State saw a meteorite fall, and. securing possession of it after
much digging, he was offered $105 by a college for his "find." But
the owner of the land on which the meteorite fell claimed the money,
and the two went to law about it. After an appeal to the highest court
of the State, it was finally decided that neither by right of discovery,
nor by right of labor, could the workman have the money, because the
title to the meteorite was in the man who owned the land upon which it
fell.
Observe the effect now upon Rent and Wages. When other men come, instead
of finding half of the best land still common and free, as in the corresponding
chart on page 68, they find all of it owned, and are obliged either to go
upon poorer land or to buy or rent from owners of the best. How much will
they pay for the best? Not more than 1, if they want it for use and not to
hold for a higher price in the future, for that represents the full difference
between its productiveness and the productiveness of the next best. But if
the first-comers, reasoning that the next best land will soon be scarce and
theirs will then rise in value, refuse to sell or to rent at that valuation,
the newcomers must resort to land of the second grade, though the best be
as yet only partly used. Consequently land of the first grade commands Rent
before it otherwise would.
As the sellers' price, under these circumstances, is arbitrary it cannot
be stated in the chart; but the buyers' price is limited by the superiority
of the best land over that which can be had for nothing, and the chart may
be made to show it: [chart]
And now, owing to the success of the appropriators of the best land in securing
more than their fellows for the same expenditure of labor force, a rush is
made for unappropriated land. It is not to use it that it is wanted, but
to enable its appropriators to put Rent into their own pockets as soon as
growing demand for land makes it valuable.101 We may, for illustration, suppose
that all the remainder of the second space and the whole of the third are
thus appropriated, and note the effect: [chart]
At this point Rent does not increase nor Wages fall, because there is no
increased demand for land for use. The holding of inferior land for higher
prices, when demand for use is at a standstill, is like owning lots in the
moon — entertaining, perhaps, but not profitable. But let more land
be needed for use, and matters promptly assume a different appearance. The
new labor must either go to the space that yields but 1, or buy or rent from
owners of better grades, or hire out. The effect would be the same in any
case. Nobody for the given expenditure of labor force would get more than
1; the surplus of products would go to landowners as Rent, either directly
in rent payments, or indirectly through lower Wages. Thus: [chart]
101. The text speaks of Rent only as a periodical or continuous
payment — what would be called "ground rent." But actual
or potential Rent may always be, and frequently is, capitalized for the
purpose of selling the right to enjoy it, and it is to selling value
that we usually refer when dealing in land.
Land which has the power of yielding Rent to its owner
will have a selling value, whether it be used or not, and whether Rent
is actually derived from it or not. This selling value will be the capitalization
of its present or prospective power of producing Rent. In fact, much
the larger proportion of laud that has a selling value is wholly or partly
unused, producing no Rent at all, or less than it would if fully used.
This condition is expressed in the chart by the blue color.
"The capitalized value of land is the actuarial 'discounted'
value of all the net incomes which it is likely to afford, allowance
being made on the one hand for all incidental expenses, including those
of collecting the rents, and on the other for its mineral wealth, its
capabilities of development for any kind of business, and its advantages,
material, social, and aesthetic, for the purposes of residence." — Marshall's
Prin., book vi, ch. ix, sec. 9.
"The value of land is commonly expressed as a certain
number of times the current money rental, or in other words, a certain
'number of years' purchase' of that rental; and other things being equal,
it will be the higher the more important these direct gratifications
are, as well as the greater the chance that they and the money income
afforded by the land will rise." — Id., note.
"Value . . . means not utility, not any quality inhering
in the thing itself, but a quality which gives to the possession of a
thing the power of obtaining other things, in return for it or for its
use. . . Value in this sense — the usual sense — is purely
relative. It exists from and is measured by the power of obtaining things
for things by exchanging them. . . Utility is necessary to value, for
nothing can be valuable unless it has the quality of gratifying some
physical or mental desire of man, though it be but a fancy or whim. But
utility of itself does not give value. . . If we ask ourselves the reason
of . . . variations in . . . value . . . we see that things having some
form of utility or desirability, are valuable or not valuable, as they
are hard or easy to get. And if we ask further, we may see that with
most of the things that have value this difficulty or ease of getting
them, which determines value, depends on the amount of labor which must
be expended in producing them ; i.e., bringing them into the place, form
and condition in which they are desired. . . Value is simply an expression
of the labor required for the production of such a thing. But there are
some things as to which this is not so clear. Land is not produced by
labor, yet land, irrespective of any improvements that labor has made
on it, often has value. . . Yet a little examination will show that such
facts are but exemplifications of the general principle, just as the
rise of a balloon and the fall of a stone both exemplify the universal
law of gravitation. . . The value of everything produced by labor, from
a pound of chalk or a paper of pins to the elaborate structure and appurtenances
of a first-class ocean steamer, is resolvable on analysis into an equivalent
of the labor required to produce such a thing in form and place; while
the value of things not produced by labor, but nevertheless susceptible
of ownership, is in the same way resolvable into an equivalent of the
labor which the ownership of such a thing enables the owner to obtain
or save." — Perplexed Philosopher, ch. v.
The figure 1 in parenthesis, as an item of Rent, indicates potential Rent.
Labor would give that much for the privilege of using the space, but the
owners hold out for better terms; therefore neither Rent nor Wages is actually
produced, though but for this both might be.
In this chart, notwithstanding that but little space is used, indicated
with red, Wages are reduced to the same low point by the mere appropriation
of space, indicated with blue, that they would reach if all the space above
the poorest were fully used. It thereby appears that under a system which
confiscates Rent to private uses, the demand for land for speculative purposes
becomes so great that Wages fall to a minimum long before they would if land
were appropriated only for use.
In illustrating the effect of confiscating Rent to private use we have as
yet ignored the element of social growth. Let us now assume as before (page
73), that social growth increases the productive power of the given expenditure
of labor force to 100 when applied to the best land, 50 when applied to the
next best, 10 to the next, 3 to the next, and 1 to the poorest. Labor would
not be benefited now, as it appeared to be when on page 73 we illustrated
the appropriation of land for use only, although much less land is actually
used. The prizes which expectation of future social growth dangles before
men as the rewards of owning land, would raise demand so as to make it more
than ever difficult to get land. All of the fourth grade would be taken up
in expectation of future demand; and "surplus labor" would be crowded
out to the open space that originally yielded nothing, but which in consequence
of increased labor power now yields as much as the poorest closed space originally
yielded, namely, 1 to the given expenditure of labor force.102 Wages would
then be reduced to the present productiveness of the open space. Thus: [chart]
102. The paradise to which the youth of our country have
so long been directed in the advice, "Go West, young man, go West," is
truthfully described in "Progress and Poverty," book iv, ch.
iv, as follows :
"The man who sets out from the eastern seaboard
in search of the margin of cultivation, where he may obtain land without
paying rent, must, like the man who swam the river to get a drink,
pass for long distances through half-titled farms, and traverse vast
areas of virgin soil, before he reaches the point where land can be
had free of rent — i.e., by homestead entry or preemption."
If we assume that 1 for the given expenditure of labor force is the least
that labor can take while exerting the same force, the downward movement
of Wages will be here held in equilibrium. They cannot fall below 1; but
neither can they rise above it, no matter how much productive power may increase,
so long as it pays to hold land for higher values. Some laborers would continually
be pushed back to land which increased productive power would have brought
up in productiveness from 0 to 1, and by perpetual competition for work would
so regulate the labor market that the given expenditure of labor force, however
much it produced, could nowhere secure more than 1 in Wages.103 And this
tendency would persist until some labor was forced upon land which, despite
increase in productive power, would not yield the accustomed living without
increase of labor force. Competition for work would then compel all laborers
to increase their expenditure of labor force, and to do it over and over
again as progress went on and lower and lower grades of land were monopolized,
until human endurance could go no further.104 Either that, or they would
be obliged to adapt themselves to a lower scale of living.105
103. Henry Fawcett, in his work on "Political Economy," book
ii, ch. iii, observes with reference to improvements in agricultural
implements which diminish the expense of cultivation, that they do not
increase the profits of the farmer or the wages of his laborers, but
that "the landlord will receive in addition to the rent already
paid to him, all that is saved in the expense of cultivation." This
is true not alone of improvements in agriculture, but also of improvements
in all other branches of industry.
104. "The cause which limits speculation in commodities,
the tendency of increasing price to draw forth additional supplies, cannot
limit the speculative advance in land values, as land is a fixed quantity,
which human agency can neither increase nor diminish; but there is nevertheless
a limit to the price of land, in the minimum required by labor and capital
as the condition of engaging in production. If it were possible to continuously
reduce wages until zero were reached, it would be possible to continuously
increase rent until it swallowed up the whole produce. But as wages cannot
be permanently reduced below the point at which laborers will consent
to work and reproduce, nor interest below the point at which capital
will be devoted to production, there is a limit which restrains the speculative
advance of rent. Hence, speculation cannot have the same scope to advance
rent in countries where wages and interest are already near the minimum,
as in countries where they are considerably above it. Yet that there
is in all progressive countries a constant tendency in the speculative
advance of rent to overpass the limit where production would cease, is,
I think, shown by recurring seasons of industrial paralysis." — Progress
and Poverty, book iv, ch. iv.
105. As Puck once put it, "the man who makes two
blades of grass to grow where but one grew before, must not be surprised
when ordered to 'keep off the grass.' "
They in fact do both, and the incidental disturbances of general readjustment
are what we call "hard times." 106 These culminate in forcing unused
land into the market, thereby reducing Rent and reviving industry. Thus increase
of labor force, a lowering of the scale of living, and depression of Rent,
co-operate to bring on what we call "good times." But no sooner
do "good times" return than renewed demands for land set in, Rent
rises again, Wages fall again, and "hard times" duly reappear.
The end of every period of "hard times" finds Rent higher and Wages
lower than at the end of the previous period.107
106. "That a speculative advance in rent or land
values invariably precedes each of these seasons of industrial depression
is everywhere clear. That they bear to each other the relation of cause
and effect, is obvious to whoever considers the necessary relation between
land and labor." — Progress and Poverty, book v, ch. i.
107. What are called "good times" reach a point
at which an upward land market sets in. From that point there is a downward
tendency of wages (or a rise in the cost of living, which is the same
thing) in all departments of labor and with all grades of laborers. This
tendency continues until the fictitious values of land give way. So long
as the tendency is felt only by that class which is hired for wages,
it is poverty merely; when the same tendency is felt by the class of
labor that is distinguished as "the business interests of the country," it
is "hard times." And "hard times" are periodical
because land values, by falling, allow "good times" to set
it, and by rising with "good times" bring "hard times" on
again. The effect of "hard times" may be overcome, without
much, if any, fall in land values, by sufficient increase in productive
power to overtake the fictitious value of land.
The dishonest and disorderly system under which society confiscates Rent
from common to individual uses, produces this result. That maladjustment
is the fundamental cause of poverty. And progress, so long as the maladjustment
continues, instead of tending to remove poverty as naturally it should, actually
generates and intensifies it. Poverty persists with increase of productive
power because land values, when Rent is privately appropriated, tend to even
greater increase. There can be but one outcome if this continues: for individuals
suffering and degradation, and for society destruction.
... read the book
Michael Hudson: The Lies of
the Land: How and why land gets undervalued
Turning
land-value gains into capital gains
Hiding the free lunch
Two appraisal methods
How land gets a negative value!
Where did all the land value go?
A curious asymmetry
Site values as the economy's "credit sink"
Immortally aging buildings
Real estate industry's priorities
THE FREE LUNCH Its cost to citizens
Its cost to the economy
Two appraisal
methods
PROPERTY IS APPRAISED in two ways.
Both start by estimating its
market value.
- The land-residual approach subtracts the value of
buildings from this overall value, designating the remainder as the
value of land. Building values may be estimated in terms of their
replacement cost (which usually produces a very high estimate, leaving
little land value) or their depreciated value (which gives an
unrealistically low building estimate, inasmuch as maintenance and
repairs save most buildings from deteriorating through wear and tear).
Using the depreciated value method leaves a higher residual land value.
The Federal Reserve Board recently has experimented with a hybrid
intermediate method that values buildings on the basis of their
"historical costs".
- The building-residual approach starts by valuing
the land, and treats the difference as representing the building's
value. The
first step in this approach is to construct a land-value map for the
district or city. This displays fairly smooth contours for land
values. Overlays would show zoning variations. Most of the variations
in property prices around this normalized map will be for structures,
along with a sizable component of "errors and omissions." This approach
rarely is used, and most assessed land values vary drastically from one
parcel to the next. The problem is especially apparent in the case of
parking lots or one-story "taxpayers," that is, inexpensive buildings
in neighbourhoods that are heavily built up. Their purpose is simply to
be rented out at enough to carry the property's tax bill, not to
maximise the site's current economic value.
Note that the Fed's land-residual
appraisal methods do not
acknowledge the possibility that the land itself may be rising in
price. Site values appear as the passive derivative, not as the
driving force. Yet low-rise or vacant land sites tend to appreciate
as much as (or in many cases, even more than) the improved properties
around them. Hence this price appreciation cannot be attributed to
rising construction costs. If every property in the country were
built last year, the problem would be simple enough. The land
acquisition prices and construction costs would be recorded, adding
up to the property's value. But many structures were erected as long
ago as the 19th century. How do we decide how much their value has
changed in comparison to the property's overall value?
The Federal Reserve multiplies the
building's original cost by the
rise in the construction price index since its completion. The
implication is that when a property is sold at a higher price (which
usually happens), it is because the building itself has risen in
value, not the land site. However, if the property must be sold at a
lower price, falling land prices are blamed.
If it is agreed
that any explanation of land/building relations
should be symmetrical through boom and bust periods alike, then the
same appraisal methodology should be able to explain the decline of
property values as well as their rise. The methodology should be as
uniform and homogeneous as possible. By
that, I mean that similar land should be valued at a homogeneous
price, and buildings of equivalent worth should be valued
accordingly.
If these two criteria are
accepted, then I believe that economists
would treat buildings as the residual, not the land. Yet just the
opposite usually is done. ...
One clear sign of land-price
inflation is that one category of
land rises or falls much more rapidly than others. A widening
disparity usually reflects a financial inflation. In Japan, for
instance, high rates of saving were recycled to a remarkable extent
into construction and real estate acquisition. Japanese authorities
produced detailed land-value statistics for each category of land,
showing property values during the Bubble years 1985-90 rising at an
accelerating pace until 1991, and then turning downward. The A-shaped
rise and fall was steepest for the most expensive land surrounding
the Tokyo palace, while land for single-story wooden residential
housing rose and fell least steeply. A
land-value map placing the
highest values at the center and the lowest values in the outlying
areas would tend to reflect a land-price bubble when price ratios
steepened. On the other hand, a fairly level set of land values
between the central city and its outskirts would indicate relatively
less rent of location, and hence less land-value disparities. Using
this analogy to examine New York City's midtown area, the steep
land-value curve has been fed by credit as affluent buyers sought the
most prestigious locations. Land sites have become the receptacle of
the economy's surplus savings. ... Read the
whole article
Jeff Smith and Kris Nelson: Giving
Life to the Property Tax Shift (PTS)
John Muir is right. "Tug on any
one
thing and find it connected to everything else in the universe." Tug on
the property tax and find it connected to urban slums, farmland loss,
political favoritism, and unearned equity with disrupted neighborhood
tenure. Echoing Thoreau, the more familiar reforms have failed to
address this many-headed hydra at its root. To think that the root
could be chopped by a mere shift in the property tax base -- from
buildings to land -- must seem like the epitome of unfounded faith. Yet
the evidence shows that state and local tax activists do have a
powerful, if subtle, tool at their disposal. The "stick" spurring
efficient use of land is a higher tax rate upon land, up to even the
site's full annual value. The "carrot" rewarding efficient use of land
is a lower or zero tax rate upon improvements. ...
The failed policy that the PTS would replace
is the present property tax. This is actually two taxes in one, one on
land and another on improvements. The tax on improvements penalizes
owners for improving. This negative incentive does its greatest damage
at the margin, where profit is slim. There, rather than pay a higher
tax, owners let buildings dilapidate into slums. The lack of much tax
on land keeps overhead on speculators affordable. This negative
incentive lets owners under-utilize prime sites, even withhold them
from use entirely. Kept from prime sites, development sprawls outward.
Sprawl inflates the values of suburban and rural land. Leap-frog
development raises a few spikes in a land value map that soon pull up
values everywhere, increasing the property tax burden of owners of
previously developed sites, unless the tax is capped. The
resultant
sprawl also raises enormously the cost of extending infrastructure and
makes auto-dependency a given.
The PTS reverses all these negative consequences.
- Rather than burden
construction, taxing only land spares it.
- Rather than spread
development (hooking us on cars), taxing land concentrates it
(providing a market for mass transit).
- Rather than inflate land price,
a land tax squashes it.
- Rather than enrich the owners of
prime sites or
itself, a land-taxing government could rebate some collected site rent
as a dividend, perhaps in the form of a Housing Voucher, making home
ownership inflation-proof.
A big problem needs a big solution which
in turn needs a
matching shift of our prevailing paradigm. Geonomics -- advocating that
we share the social value of sites and natural resources and untax
earnings -- does just that. Read the whole article
Tony Vickers: From Zee to Vee:
using property tax assessments to monitor the economic landscape
The ‘real world’ in which human
society exists is not
confined to natural, physical phenomena. From earliest times, human
beings have interacted socially and economically. As they do so, they
have specialised and traded in goods and services which are the
products of combinations of labour, capital, enterprise and the
fourth – often forgotten but distinct – factor of all production:
land.
Land comprises all natural
resources, not just ‘terra
firma.’ It is the universe minus man’s products. Even the
simplest of human activities, sleep, requires each of us to occupy
exclusively a space, a location, preferably a bed in a home of our
own. But that word ‘own’ conjures emotions and political
postures.
As everyone who deals in real
estate knows, there are three most
important things about their stock in trade: location, location and
location! Because the market value attached to locations varies over
space and time, our real world conceals a shifting and invisible
‘land-value-scape’. We can see the roof-tops and admire (or
deplore) the physical view. We can measure the bricks and timber in
three dimensions. We cannot see the fourth dimension, the fourth
factor that comprises 20% to 60% of the market value of our homes:
‘v’ or value of land per unit area.
But we know it is
there.
Just as every point on the surface
of planet Earth has a
‘z’ that defines its place in the landscape, so every
location has a value in the global economy. This value is a function
of three things:
- content (soil, air or water quality; metallic
composition of rock);
- accessibility (position in relation to human
society); and
- the wealth of that particular community.
Unlike other, natural, phenomena
in the real world, the
landvaluescape changes over time and space at a fairly rapid and
often unpredictable rate. Value only has meaning where there is both
human knowledge of the existence of a place and its natural wealth
potential and the possibility of converting that potential
into products that others will wish to buy. Knowledge of places and
utility of resources vary with time, as do the workings of markets:
physical means of exchange of goods.
For example, the discovery of a
new continent immediately gives
value to the place in the minds of the crew of the ship that
discovers it – as does the discovery of the mysteries of the
genetic code in a plant species or the broadcast spectrum. Unless the
ship’s captain charts the discovery and brings the chart safely
back to port – with the plants of the continent – or
transmits the information about it through the air-waves,
‘discovery’ has no value in any market place. Whether we
talk about value in exchange or value in use, the measure of
‘v’ given to a location depends on social context.
The most important difference
between measuring ‘v’ and
measuring ‘z’ is that there is no single objective value of
any location, other than at those somewhat rare points in time when
real estate is traded, when market price is the surrogate for market
value. Even then, transactions that are to form the basis of market
valuations need, in theory, to be made in certain idealised
conditions, such as open competition between buyers and sellers. All
potential parties to the transaction should have perfect information
about other similar contemporaneous transactions – and be in an
‘arms length’ relationship. Contracting parties are assumed
to be of sound mind! No two transactions in real estate are ever
identical in every respect and the number of factors than can affect
price or value is enormous.
Valuation of real estate is
tricky. Separation of the value of
land/location from the value of land-and-buildings combined is even
more tricky. So is it worth the effort involved in replacing
‘z’ with ‘v’ in a three-dimensional model of
landvaluescape, in order to visualise what is going on in economies
in the geo-spatial sense? Are value maps valuable?
The unavoidable subjectivity in
assigning value to land or
locations is what many geographers, more used to mapping physical
features, find discomforting about value mapping (Dale, 2002).
Mapping things of less importance that can be measured more precisely
and objectively, is preferred to mapping property values (accounting
for at least twenty percent of the global economy) that cannot
objectively be measured at all.
Yet value maps have been attempted
for various reasons for about
one hundred years and are becoming a fairly common feature of the
property industry in some advanced countries. The last known
comprehensive survey of global practice in value mapping was over
twenty years ago, before the widespread use of the personal computer
(PC), computer aided mass assessment (CAMA) of property values and
geographic information systems (GIS). The author concluded:-
“Value maps will
increasingly play a major part in research into the causes and effects
of changes in land and property values.” (Howes, 1980) Read
the whole article
Bill Batt: The Nexus of
Transportation, Economic Rent, and Land Use
What
is Land Rent?
John Houseman, an actor perhaps most widely known as Professor
Kingsfield in the long-running TV series, The Paper Chase, later became
the pitchman for Smith Barney. In that advertisement, his tag line was
"We make money the old-fashioned way -- we earn it."
That we should earn our money rather than live off the efforts
of
others seems a simple enough moral tenet. But it seems to have lost its
cogency in contemporary economic thought. More than a century ago John
Stuart Mill noted that
Landlords
grow richer in their sleep
without working, risking or economizing. The increase in the value of
land, arising as it does from the efforts of an entire community,
should belong to the community and not to the individual who might hold
title.(1)
Today, on the other hand, the
unearned surplus which classical
economists called rent attaches to monopoly titles -- largely
the
scarce goods and services of nature like locational sites, and has
totally disappeared from economic calculus. Yet this is the primary
vehicle by which wealth is captured by economic elites. If government
recaptured the socially-created economic rent from land sites that
comes from the investment of the collective community, we could
eliminate other taxes that are both more onerous and create a drag on
the economy that makes us all poorer. There are many websites that
explain how this can be done, ways that not only beget greater economic
efficiency but also bring about economic justice.(2) The
surplus economic rent that derives from community effort is its
rightful entitlement.
Where does economic rent most tend to lodge? In the center of
cities
where people are. And also proximate to heavy social investments --
such as railroad and metro stations, public and office buildings,
hotels and conference centers, and anywhere there is high traffic in
personal or market exchanges. The land value in New York City is higher
than all the rest of the New York state combined, even though it is
only a minute fraction of the area. One 9-acre site south of the United
Nations Building was recently sold to a developer intent on building
luxury condominiums facing the East River. That site sold for $680
million, and would have been higher had the existing structure, an
obsolete power plant, not have to be razed.(3) Land
values in any given area tend to rise and fall together, and tend also
to form a contour somewhat comparable to a topographical survey map. In
a city's center are the highest value locations, analogous to a
mountain peak. Once one departs from that center, land values fall in
direct proportion to the value of their use, made more or less
attractive by whatever social attributes are provided in the proximate
areas. Two illustrations from small and medium sized cities in
the
United States illustrate the point.
Case
1: Ithaca, New York:
Tompkins County, where the city of Ithaca sits at the center, has land
values many times those within a short walk. Dividing the county land
parcels into quintiles, the highest fifth have values of $56,000 per
acre and above. The lowest fifth have a value of less than $3,000 per
acre. The high value area collectively constitutes only a minute
proportion of the total number of square miles because most of it is
farm or forest land. [see map]
Case
2: Des Moines, Iowa: Polk
County, where Des Moines sits near the center, has land values even
more disparate between urban and rural locations. The highest quartile
there are those $97,400 per acre and above, the single highest parcel
of all worth an astonishing $31.4 million per acre. Yet, the lowest
quartile, a roughly equal number of far larger parcels, all have a
value of less than $30,000 per acre. [see map]
... The failure to collect site
rent leads to a distortion in land use
configurations. If patterns unfolded along the lines of both social
preference and economic efficiency, high value landsites would tend to
have high value buildings, and low value landsites would tend to be
vacant or have very modest buildings. Consistent with this, urban
centers sites would tend to have office and commercial use, surrounded
by lower-value residential land uses, and still further out would be
farms and forests. The ratio of building to land value, land to total
value (or for that matter any other ratio between buildings, land, and
total values) would be relatively constant throughout a region.
Instead, the ratio of land value to total value consistently tends to
reveal a patchwork of random development. This inefficient settlement
of land sites is what we know as sprawl.
... read the whole article
Land Rent
From the standpoint of an economic geographer and for some land economists,
land rent is simply capitalized transportation cost. Land rent is the surplus
generated by social activity on or in the vicinity of locational sites that
accrues to titleholders of those parcels. Whether or not it is recaptured by
public policy, rent is a natural factor deriving from the intensive use of
natural capital. One must return to nineteenth-century classical economics
to appreciate the importance of economic rent or land rent; neoclassical economic
frameworks have largely discarded it.[13] More
intensive use of high-value land sites leads to site configurations that
are less dependent on transportation services. Land rent is highest where
the greatest
traffic and market exchanges occur, that being at the center of large conurbations.
Comparing land values of urban property parcels, the highest land rent
in the urban cores and traffic junctures are analogous to the contours
of land elevations.
Mountain peaks gradually slope down to valleys and flatland regions and
continue outward until at distant points — perhaps at the poles of the earth — land
sites have no market value at all.
The differentials in land values are profound, even more than most people
realize. In 1995, in the small city of Ithaca, New York, the highest quintile
of land had a value of over $56,000 per acre in the downtown center, whereas
the lowest quintile only a mile away falls to less than $3,000.[14] Large
city centers have far higher site prices. Even in Polk County, Iowa (which
includes Des Moines), in the middle of cornfields where I did a study two years
ago, the highest urban value land site was $31.3 million per acre, which quickly
declined to about $20,000 per acre only about a mile away. In the spring of
1998, one land parcel (the building was to be razed) of less than an acre in
New York City's Times Square and split in two pieces by Broadway was sold by
Prudential Life to Disney for roughly $240 million.[15] To
take another instance, a nine-acre tract on the East River in New York City
occupied by an obsolete power plant was purchased by Mort Zuckerman to build
high-rise condominiums two years ago. The sale price was in the neighborhood
of $680 million and would have been higher were it not for some enormous costs
associated with the demolition of the old structures.[16] It
should be noted that the overwhelming proportion of land value is in cities;
relatively speaking, the site values of peripheral lands, typically used for
agriculture and timber growth, are negligible. Land values are high in urban
areas because, over time, rent accrues to a site. Each improvement in proximity
to a property parcel enhances the value of all other parcels. This makes even
unimproved sites attractive objects for speculation, particularly when land
sites surrounding it are to be improved by adding either transportation service
or new structures. One nine-mile stretch of interstate highway in Albany, New
York, costing $125 million to construct, has yielded $3.8 billion in increased
land values (constant dollars) within just two miles of its corridor in the
forty years of its existence.[17] This
is a thirty-fold return in a time span typically used for bond repayment! The
Washington Metro created increments in land value along much of the 101-mile
system completed by 1980 that easily exceeded $3.5 billion, compared with the
$2.7 billion of federal funds invested in Metro up until that time.[18] Any
major building construction project, private or public, will have a similar
effect on adjacent land sites. Differentials in land value can have a profound
effect on decisions made by titleholders, either positively by inducing appropriate
development in urban cores or negatively by giving monopoly titleholders power
to hold sites out of use for long-term speculative gain. Such decisions of
course determine the character of urban configurations and society as well.
... read
the whole article
Bill Batt: Who Says Cities are Poor? They Just
Don't Know How to Tax Their Wealth!
This is relatively easy to understand by considering a vacant expanse of
land that has imposed upon it a grid of roads like a tic-tac-toe board. Suppose
each of the squares were privately owned, and development of those sites
were
to ensue, the economic surplus generated by that market activity would
raise the value of each of those locations. Let's further suppose that every
site
were developed except the center square, that titleholder choosing instead
to just hold his title vacant. Which land site, discounting the building
values, would command the greatest market price after a short time? The center
square,
of course — even though that owner made no effort to earn that increase
in price. The center square would see the greatest accretion of economic
rent because of its strategic access. It would be the passive beneficiary
of the
surplus generated by the common enterprise of all the market exchanges
resulting from the other locations. In just this way rent becomes the social
creation
of the community and not the result of any private individual's enterprise.
The more the economic activity, the more the surplus generated comes to
settle on land in the form of rent. Rent accretes to land sites and raises
their market
value, directly reflecting the varying levels of productive economic surplus
generated over time throughout a community. High economic productivity
yields high surplus rent.
If one plots the land value per unit area, whether by square foot, acre,
hectare, or square mile, as is now possible to easily do using modern computer
programs,
the differential land values are easy to approximate. Typically the center
of a city experiences the peak land value, with a precipitous decline as
one leaves the center and departs to its outer edge. The highest value locations
are the commercial cores, falling quickly as one travels out to residential
locations, and with agricultural and forest lands having only a small fraction
of the value commanded at the center. In areas of New York City, the market
price of locations has been shown to be in the vicinity of $500 million
per
acre. Even in smaller cities, there is little realization of the enormous
cost of sites in core areas: in downtown Des Moines, the price per acre was
$31.5
million. Other illustrations are easily available, particularly in urban
areas on the east and west coasts of the US. Taking another perspective,
the urbanized
center of Tompkins County, New York (Ithaca) is five percent of the land
area but contains ninety-five percent of the land value.[8] To
see where the land values are highest, it is easiest to look at a city's
skyline.[9] The
tallest buildings sit on the most expensive land parcels. Typically the
aggregate land value of a city is about 40 percent of the combined market
value of land
and improvements. The proportion of overall land value to building value
is revealed by that profile, known as a landvaluescape.[10] Some
buildings will exceed that proportion — a large investment on a small
footprint; other sites may be vacant or depreciated buildings with a far
smaller land to building ratio. The dynamic at work here is easily understood:
the
greater a land site's value the greater the incentive to take advantage
of its location; following the same logic, the more intensive the investments
in particular neighborhoods the greater market value of remaining or underused
land sites, making any locations that are underutilized good candidates
for
improvement. So it is that downtowns generate land values many times those
of farther reaches; each investment development fosters others. ... read the whole article
Ted Gwartney: Estimating Land Values
Bill Batt: Comment on Parts of
the NYS Legislative Tax Study Commission's 1985 study “Who Pays New
York Taxes?”
Little justification exists for taxing buildings, or improvements of any
sort, so this question is easily disposed of. The practice is explained largely
as a matter of historical inertia. Only in the recent century or two have
buildings represented any significant capital value; prior to the rise of
major cities, the value of real property lay essentially in land. American
cities today typically record aggregate assessed land values – at least
when the valuations are well-done – at about 40% to 60% of total taxable
value, that is, of land and buildings taken together.31 Skyscrapers reflect
enormous capital investment, and this expenditure is warranted because of
the enormous value of locational sites. Each site gets its market price from
the fact that the total neighborhood context creates an attractive market
presence and ambience. By taxing buildings, however, we impose a penalty
on their optimum development as well as on the incentives for their maintenance.
Moreover, taxes on buildings take away from whatever burden would otherwise
be imposed on sites, with the result that incentives for their highest and
best use is weakened. Lastly, the technical and administrative challenges
of properly assessing the value of improvements is daunting, particularly
since they must be depreciated for tax and accounting purposes, evaluated
for potential replacement, and so on. In fact most costs associated with
administration of property taxation and appeal litigation involve disputes
over the valuation of structures, not land values.
Land value taxation, on the other hand, overcomes all these obstacles. Locations
are the beneficiaries of community services whether they are improved or
not. As has been forcefully argued by this writer and others elsewhere,32
a tax on land value conforms to all the textbook principles of sound tax
theory. Some further considerations are worth reviewing, however, when looking
at ground rent as a flow rather than as a “present value” stock.
The technical ability to trace changes in the market prices of sites – or
as can also be understood, the variable flow of ground rent to those sites – by
the application of GIS (geographic information systems) real-time recording
of sales transactions invites wholesale changes in the maintenance of cadastral
data. The transmittal of sales records as typically received in the offices
of local governments for purposes of title registration over to Assessors’ offices
allows for the possibility of a running real-time mapping of market values.
Given also that GIS algorithms can now calculate the land value proportions
reasonably accurately, this means that “landvaluescapes” are
easily created in ways analogous to maps that portray other common geographic
features. These landvaluescapes reflect the flow of ground rent through local
or regional economies, and can also be used to identify the areas of greatest
market vitality and enterprise. The flow of economic rent can easily be taxed
in ways that overcomes the mistaken notion that it is a stock. Just as income
is recognized as a flow of money, rent too can (and should) be understood
as such.
The question still begs to be answered, “why tax land?” And
what happens when we don’t tax land? Henry George answered this more
than a century ago more forcefully and clearly, perhaps, than anyone has
since. He recognized full well that the economic surplus not expended by
human hands or minds in the production of capital wealth gravitates to land.
Particular land sites come to reflect the value of their strategic location
for market exchanges by assuming a price for their monopoly use. Regardless
whether those who acquire title to such sites use them to the full extent
of their potential, the flow of rent to such locations is commensurate with
their full capacity. This is why John Stuart Mill more than a century ago
observed that, “Landlords grow richer in their sleep without working,
risking or economizing. The increase in the value of land, arising as it
does from the efforts of an entire community, should belong to the community
and not to the individual who might hold title.”33 Absent its recovery
by taxation this rent becomes a “free lunch” to opportunistically
situated titleholders. When offered for sale, the projected rental value
is capitalized in the present value for purposes of attaching a market price
and sold as a commodity. Yet simple justice calls for the recovery in taxes
what is the community’s creation. Moreover, the failure to recover
the land rent connected to sites makes it necessary to tax productive activities
in our economy, and this leads to economic and technical inefficiency known
as “deadweight loss.”34 It means that the economy performs suboptimally.
Land, and by this Henry George meant any natural factor of production not
created by human hands or minds, is ours only to use, not to buy or sell
as a commodity. In the equally immortal words of Jefferson a century earlier, “The
earth belongs in usufruct to the living; . . . [It is] given as a common
stock for men to labor and live on.”35 This passage likely needs a
bit of parsing for the modern reader. The word usufruct, understood since
Roman times, has almost passed from use today. It means “the right
to use the property of another so long as its value is not diminished.”36
Note also that Jefferson regarded the earth as a “common stock;” not
allotted to individuals with possessory titles. Only the phrase “to
the living” might be subject to challenge by forward-looking environmentalists
who, taking an idea from Native American cultures, argue that “we do
not inherit the earth from our ancestors; we borrow it from our children.” The
presumption that real property titles are acquired legitimately is a claim
that does not withstand scrutiny; rather all such titles owe their origin
ultimately to force or fraud.37
If we own the land sites that we occupy only in usufruct, and the rent that
derives from those sites is due to community enterprise, it is not a large
logical leap to argue that the community’s recovery of that rent should
be the proper source of taxation. This is the Georgist argument: that the
recapture of land rent is the proper – indeed the natural – source
of taxation.38 ... read the whole commentary
Nic Tideman: Market-Based Systems
for Assigning Rental Value to Land
The system described so far presumes that there are many identical sites,
so that the rents offered for ones that are relinquished can reveal the value
of the ones in continued use. In fact, every site has unique characteristics,
especially in terms of the distances from other locations that are economically
relevant, and often in other ways as well. Fortunately, the initial assumption
of identical sites, which was made to explore the system, is not necessary.
It is possible to make good estimates of the rental value of all land from
information about the rental value of a small percentage of sites, because
the rental value of land tends to be a smooth function of location. Rents
are highest in the centers of cities, diminishing gradually with distance
from the center. Rents are also higher in places with characteristics such
as proximity to transit facilities or especially good views, and tend to
be lower in places that are
close to the source of a noxious smell or noise.
To take account of the differences among sites, the officials in charge
of renting land can annually examine the results of recent auctions and construct
a revised map of land rents. In constructing this map, the rent assigned
to each site that is auctioned should be not the highest bid, but rather
the second-highest bid, which represents the actual opportunity cost of a
site, what it would be worth to have one more vacant site.
Consider an example to highlight this point. Suppose that the highest bid
for a site is 1,000 rubles per year, the second-highest bid is 800 rubles
per year, and an adjacent site, with virtually identical characteristics,
is occupied by someone for whom continued use is worth 900 rubles per year.
If charged 1,000 rubles, this person will relinquish the site, and the rent
that can then be obtained for it will presumably be the 800 rubles offered
for the adjacent site. Thus it is counterproductive to assign rent that is
greater than the highest offer that is refused.
Summary of
the System Involving Actual Delivery of Land
To operate the system for determining annual rents from bids for sites that
are actually delivered for use, the officials in charge of renting land simply
auction every site that is relinquished by its previous user. According to
the terms of the auction, the bid represents an offer of rent for the first
year's use, with use of the site going to the highest bidder at a price of
the second highest bid. The highest bidder also receives an option to continue
to use the site into the indefinite future, upon payment of rent that will
be determined, year by year, by rent maps constructed from bids in auctions
that will be conducted in the same way.
The user of any site is permitted to terminate use at any time, provided
that the site is restored to a condition of bare land. To protect against
the abandonment of sites in a condition in which it is expensive to restore
them to an unimproved state, anyone who wishes to build can be required to
post a bond against the cost of demolition.
Any user of land is permitted to sell both the improvements on a site and
the right to continue renting the site to anyone else, for any price on which
they mutually agree. However, it can be expected that the prices that will
secure agreement will reflect little if anything more than the value of the
improvements, because the right to use sites can be obtained at auction just
by offering a small amount more than what others are offering for the first
year's rent.
Each year the land-managing bureaucracy will construct a new map of land
value, based on the second-highest bids for sites that have been auctioned
recently. Rent bills for all land will then be sent out, based on this map.
... read the whole article
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