Untaxing
Buildings and other Capital
Untaxing buildings is part of
encouraging a landholder to develop a site to its highest and best
use. Why penalize him for his enterprise? His enterprise
creates jobs, both in the development/redevelopment of the property,
and in the building itself on an ongoing basis.
At the level of the society or economy as a whole, untaxing capital and
buildings will lead to economic growth. What's not to like?
It is an axiom of statesmanship, which the successful founders of tyranny
have understood and acted upon that great changes can best be brought about
under old forms. We, who would free men, should heed the same truth. It
is the natural method. When nature would make a higher type, she takes
a lower one and develops it. This, also, is the law of social growth. Let
us work by it. With the current we may glide fast and far. Against it,
it is hard pulling and slow progress.
By making use of this existing machinery, we may, without jar or shock, assert
the common right to land by appropriating rent by taxation. We already take some
rent in taxation. We have only to make some changes in our modes of taxation
to take it all.*
*Rent in the economic sense is not, as those unfamiliar
with economic terminology may assume, the whole amount paid for the
use of real estate. It is only that part of such amount which is paid
for the use of the bare land or site employed, exclusive of the payment
for the use of any buildings or other improvements on it. H. G. B.
In form, the ownership of land would remain just as now. No owner of land
need be dispossessed, and no restriction need be placed upon the amount
of land any one could hold. For, rent being taken by the State in taxes,
land, no matter in whose name it stood, or in what parcels it was held,
would be really common property, and every member of the community would
participate in the advantages of its ownership.
Now, insomuch as the taxation of rent, or land values, must necessarily
be increased just as we abolish other taxes, we may put the proposition
into practical form by proposing --
to abolish all taxation save that upon land
values.
As we have seen, the value of land is at the beginning of society nothing,
but as society develops by the increase of population and the advance of
the arts, it becomes greater and greater. In every civilized country, even
the newest, the value of the land taken as a whole is sufficient to bear
the entire expenses of government. In the better developed countries it
is much more than sufficient. Hence it will not be enough merely to place
all taxes upon the value of land. It will be necessary, where rent exceeds
the present governmental revenues, commensurately to increase the amount
demanded in taxation, and to continue this increase as society progresses
and rent advances. But this is so natural and easy a matter, that it may
be considered as involved, or at least understood, in the proposition to
put all taxes on the value of land. That is the first step upon which the
practical struggle must be made. When the hare is once caught and killed,
cooking him will follow as a matter of course. When the common right to
land is so far appreciated that all taxes are abolished save those which
fall upon rent, there is no danger of much more than is necessary to induce
them to collect the public revenues being left to individual landholders.
Wherever the idea of concentrating all taxation upon land values finds
lodgment sufficient to induce consideration, it invariably makes way, but
there are few of the classes most to be benefited by it, who at first,
or even for a long time afterward, see its full significance and power.
- It is difficult for workingmen to get over the idea that there is a
real antagonism between capital and labor.
- It is difficult for small farmers and homestead owners to get over
the idea that to put all taxes on the value of land would be unduly to
tax them.
- It is difficult for both classes to get over the idea that to exempt
capital from taxation would be to make the rich richer, and the poor
poorer.
These ideas spring from confused thought. But behind ignorance and prejudice
there is a powerful interest, which has hitherto dominated literature,
education, and opinion. A great wrong always dies hard, and the great wrong
which in every civilized country condemns the masses of men to poverty
and want, will not die without a bitter struggle. ... read the whole chapter
H.G. Brown: Significant
Paragraphs from Henry George's Progress & Poverty:
10. Effect of Remedy Upon Wealth Production (in the unabridged P&P: Part
IX — Effects of the Remedy: Chapter 1 — Of the effect upon the
production of wealth)
The elder Mirabeau, we are told, ranked the proposition of Quesnay, to substitute
one single tax on rent (the impôt unique) for all other taxes,
as a discovery equal in utility to the invention of writing or the substitution
of the use of money for barter.
To whosoever will think over the matter, this saying will appear an evidence
of penetration rather than of extravagance. The advantages which would be gained
by substituting for the numerous taxes by which the public revenues are now
raised, a single tax levied upon the value of land, will appear more and more
important the more they are considered.
- This is the secret which would transform the little village into the
great city.*
- With all the burdens removed which now oppress industry and hamper exchange,
the production of wealth would go on with a rapidity now undreamed
of.
- This, in its turn, would lead to an increase in the value of land — a
new surplus which society might take for general purposes.
- And released from the difficulties which attend the collection of revenue
in a way that begets corruption and renders legislation the tool of
special interests, society could assume functions which the increasing
complexity
of life makes it desirable to assume, but which the prospect of political
demoralization under the present system now leads thoughtful men to
shrink from.
*At the beginning of Book
IX of the complete Progress & Poverty, Henry George quotes from
Themistocles: "I cannot play upon any stringed instrument, but I
can tell you how of a little village to make a great and glorious city."
Consider the effect upon the production of wealth.
To abolish the taxation which, acting and reacting, now hampers every wheel
of exchange and presses upon every form of industry, would be like removing
an immense weight from a powerful spring. Imbued with fresh energy, production
would start into new life, and trade would receive a stimulus which would be
felt to the remotest arteries. The present method of taxation operates upon
exchange like artificial deserts and mountains;
- it costs more to get goods through a custom house than it does to carry
them around the world.
- It operates upon energy, and industry, and skill, and thrift, like a
fine upon those qualities.
- If I have worked harder and built myself a good house while you have
been contented to live in a hovel, the taxgatherer now comes annually to
make
me pay a penalty for my energy and industry, by taxing me more than
you.
- If I have saved while you wasted, I am mulct, while you are exempt.
- If a man build a ship we make him pay for his temerity, as though he
had done an injury to the state;
- if a railroad be opened, down comes the tax collector upon it, as though
it were a public nuisance;
- if a manufactory be erected we levy upon it an annual sum which would
go far toward making a handsome profit.
- We say we want capital, but if any one accumulate it, or bring it among
us, we charge him for it as though we were giving him a privilege.
- We punish with a tax the man who covers barren fields with ripening
grain,
- we fine him who puts up machinery, and him who drains a swamp.
How heavily these taxes burden production only those realize who have attempted
to follow our system of taxation through its ramifications, for, as I have
before said, the heaviest part of taxation is that which falls in increased
prices.
To abolish these taxes would be to lift the whole enormous weight of taxation
from productive industry. The needle of the seamstress and the great manufactory;
the cart horse and the locomotive; the fishing boat and the steamship;
the farmer's plow and the merchant's stock, would be alike untaxed. All would
be
free to make or to save, to buy or to sell, unfined by taxes, unannoyed
by the taxgatherer. Instead of saying to the producer, as it does now, "The
more you add to the general wealth the more shall you be taxed!" the state
would say to the producer, "Be as industrious, as thrifty, as enterprising
as you choose, you shall have your full reward! You shall not be fined
for making two blades of grass grow where one grew before; you shall not
be taxed
for adding to the aggregate wealth."
And will not the community gain by thus refusing to kill the goose that lays
the golden eggs; by thus refraining from muzzling the ox that treadeth out
the corn; by thus leaving to industry, and thrift, and skill, their natural
reward, full and unimpaired? For there is to the community also a natural reward.
The law of society is, each for all, as well as all for each. No one can keep
to himself the good he may do, any more than he can keep the bad. Every productive
enterprise, besides its return to those who undertake it, yields collateral
advantages to others. If a man plant a fruit tree, his gain is that he gathers
the fruit in its time and season. But in addition to his gain, there is a gain
to the whole community. Others than the owner are benefited by the increased
supply of fruit; the birds which it shelters fly far and wide; the rain which
it helps to attract falls not alone on his field; and, even to the eye which
rests upon it from a distance, it brings a sense of beauty. And so with everything
else. The building of a house, a factory, a ship, or a railroad, benefits others
besides those who get the direct profits.
... Well may the community leave to the individual producer all that prompts
him to exertion; well may it let the laborer have the full reward of his labor,
and the capitalist the full return of his capital. For the more that labor
and capital produce, the greater grows the common wealth in which all may share.
And in the value or rent of land is this general gain expressed in a definite
and concrete form. Here is a fund which the state may take while leaving to
labor and capital their full reward. With increased activity of production
this would commensurately increase.
And to shift the burden of taxation from production and exchange to the value
or rent of land would not merely be to give new stimulus to the production
of wealth; it would be to open new opportunities. For under this system no
one would care to hold land unless to use it, and land now withheld from use
would everywhere be thrown open to improvement.
The selling price of land would fall; land speculation would receive its death
blow; land monopolization would no longer pay.* Millions and millions of acres
from which settlers are now shut out by high prices would be abandoned by their
present owners or sold to settlers upon nominal terms. And this not merely
on the frontiers, but within what are now considered well settled districts.
* The fact that a tax on the rental value of land cannot
be shifted by landowners to tenants, though recognized by all competent
economists, is sometimes a stumbling block to persons untrained in economics.
The reason such a tax cannot be shifted is that it cannot limit the supply
of land. Landowners are presumably, before the tax is laid, charging all
the rent they can get. There is nothing in a tax on the rental value of
land to make tenants willing to pay more or to make land more difficult
to hire. On the contrary, more land will be on the market, because of such
a tax, rather than less, since the tax puts a heavy penalty on holding
land out of use and unimproved for mere speculation. The competition of
former vacant land speculators to get their land used will make land cheaper
to rent rather than more expensive. And since only the net rent remaining
after the tax is subtracted is capitalized into salable value, land will
be very much cheaper to buy. H.G.B.
And it must be remembered that this would apply, not merely to agricultural
land, but to all land. Mineral land would be thrown open to use, just as agricultural
land; and in the heart of a city no one could afford to keep land from its
most profitable use, or on the outskirts to demand more for it than the use
to which it could at the time be put would warrant. Everywhere that land had
attained a value, taxation, instead of operating, as now, as a fine upon improvement,
would operate to force improvement. Whoever planted an orchard, or sowed a
field, or built a house, or erected a manufactory, no matter how costly, would
have no more to pay in taxes than if he kept so much land idle.
- The monopolist of agricultural land would be taxed as much as though
his land were covered with houses and barns, with crops and with stock.
- The owner of a vacant city lot would have to pay as much for the privilege
of keeping other people off of it until he wanted to use it, as his
neighbor who has a fine house upon his lot.
- It would cost as much to keep a row of tumble-down shanties upon valuable
land as though it were covered with a grand hotel or a pile of great
warehouses filled with costly goods.
Thus, the bonus that wherever labor is most productive must now be paid before
labor can be exerted would disappear.
- The farmer would not have to pay out half his means, or mortgage his
labor for years, in order to obtain land to cultivate;
- the builder of a city homestead would not have to lay out as much for
a small lot as for the house he puts upon it*;
- the company that proposed to erect a manufactory would not have to expend
a great part of its capital for a site.
- And what would be paid from year to year to the state would be in lieu
of all the taxes now levied upon improvements, machinery, and stock.
*Many persons, and among them some professional economists,
have never succeeded in getting a thorough comprehension of this point.
Thus, the editor has heard the objection advanced that the greater
cheapness of land is no advantage to the poor man who is trying to
save enough from his earnings to buy a piece of land; for, it is said,
the higher taxes on the land after it is acquired, offset the lower
purchase price. What such objectors do not see is that even if the
lower price of land does no more than balance the higher tax on it,
(and this overlooks, for one thing, the discouragement to speculation
in land), the reduction or removal of other taxes is all clear gain.
It is easier to save in proportion as earnings and commodities are
relieved of taxation. It is easier to buy land, because its selling
price is lower, if the land is taxed. And although the land, after
its purchase, continues to be taxed, not only can this tax be fully
paid out of the annual interest on the saving in the purchase price,
but also there is to be reckoned the saving in taxes on buildings and
other improvements and in whatever other taxes are thus rendered unnecessary.
H.G.B.
Consider the effect of such a change upon the labor market. Competition
would no longer be one-sided, as now. Instead of laborers competing with
each other
for employment, and in their competition cutting down wages to the point
of bare subsistence, employers would everywhere be competing for laborers,
and
wages would rise to the fair earnings of labor. For into the labor market
would have entered the greatest of all competitors for the employment of
labor, a
competitor whose demand cannot be satisfied until want is satisfied — the
demand of labor itself. The employers of labor would not have merely to
bid against other employers, all feeling the stimulus of greater trade
and increased
profits, but against the ability of laborers to become their own employers
upon the natural opportunities freely opened to them by the tax which prevented
monopolization.
With natural opportunities thus free to labor;
- with capital and improvements exempt from tax, and exchange released
from restrictions, the spectacle of willing men unable to turn their labor
into
the things they are suffering for would become impossible;
- the recurring paroxysms which paralyze industry would cease;
- every wheel of production would be set in motion;
- demand would keep pace with supply, and supply with demand;
- trade would increase in every direction, and wealth augment on every
hand. ... read the whole chapter
Louis Post: Outlines of Louis F. Post's
Lectures, with Illustrative Notes and Charts (1894) — Appendix:
FAQ
Q6. If a land-owner builds, does not that increase the value of his
land and consequently the amount of the tax he would have to pay? If so,
would not he be taxed for his improvement?
A. No. Upon the value of the building he would never pay any tax. It is true
that his improvement might attract others to the locality in such numbers
as to make land there scarcer and consequently dearer. His own lot would
in that case rise in value with the other land and be taxed more, just as
the rest would be. But that would not take any of his labor in taxes; he
would still have his building free of taxation. Thus: If on a lot worth $1000
a building worth $1000 were erected, making the whole worth $2000, the tax
would fall only upon the $1000 which represents the value of the lot. If
land then became so scarce that the lot rose in value to $1500 the tax would
be raised. But the owner's improvement would be still exempt. When his property
was worth $2000 he was taxed on $1000, the value of the lot, leaving $1000,
the value of the building, free; and now, though he is taxed on $1500, the
value of the lot, $1000, the value of the building, is still free.
Q20. Would not the single tax increase the rent of houses?
A. No. It takes taxes off buildings and materials, thus making it cheaper
to build houses. How can house rent go up as the cost of building houses
goes down? Read pp. 5 to 8 and the related notes. ... read the book
Charles B. Fillebrown: A Catechism
of Natural Taxation, from Principles of
Natural Taxation (1917)
Q55. How would the single tax effect the tenant?
A. It would neither increase nor decrease his land rent. It would reduce his
house rent by the amount of the house tax. ... read the whole article
Ted Gwartney: Estimating
Land Values
The economic market rental value
of land should be sufficient to
finance public services and to obviate the need for raising revenue
from taxes, such as income or wage taxes; sales, commodity or
value-added taxes; and taxes on buildings, machinery and industry.
Public revenue should not be supplied by taxes on people and
enterprise until after all of the available revenue has been first
collected from the natural and community created value of land. Only
if land rent were insufficient would it be necessary to collect any
taxes.
The collection of land rent, by
the public for supplying public
needs, returns the advantage an individual receives from the
exclusive use of a land site to the balance of the community, who
along with nature, contributed to its value and allow its exclusive
use. ...
Adam Smith, in The Wealth of
Nations, suggested that any "tax"
should be a charge for services which benefit all people and are more
efficiently performed by a single cooperative effort. He postulated
four principles of taxation which any source of revenue should
meet:
1. Light on the
production of wealth, and does not impede
or reduce production;
2. Cheap to collect, requiring few collectors, and easy to
understand;
3. Certain; can't be avoided, little opportunity for corruption,
and provides adequate revenue;
4. Equitable and fair, payment for benefits received, impartial,
and just.
Collecting public revenue from
land rent is the only revenue
source, or "tax", that meets these criteria.
While the major argument for
raising public revenue from land rent
and natural resources is because it is equitable and fair, it is also
the most efficient method of raising the revenue which is needed for
public facilities and services. Land is visible, can't be hidden and
its valuation is less intrusive than valuations of income and sales.
Taxes on labor and capital cause people to consider alternative
options, including working with less effort, which produces less real
goods. For example, a tax on wages will reduce after-tax net wages
and weaken the incentive to work. A person might be willing to work
hard for a wage of $20 per hour, but decide to drop out if the taxes
take $8 and the net wage is only $12 per hour. Economists claim that
present taxes account for a 25% loss in production in the United
States. Production and consumption would be greatly improved if
public revenue came primarily from land rather than a wage tax. The
same would occur when buildings and machinery are taxed. The tax on
building reduces the quantity and quality of buildings produced. A
tax on sales, commerce or value added reduces consumption, production
and net wealth. Sales tax evasion in the United States has exceeded
30% in recent years.
As new inventions and more
efficient ways of producing goods are
discovered, people's economic well-being is not improved, because
they have lost access to land and must pay both rent and taxes. (5)
Instead of rent being used to provide community services, capital and
wages must be depleted, which obstructs private enterprise.
When the rent of land is taken
for public purposes production and
distribution are not held back. This is because the same amount of
rent would otherwise have been taken by some private individual. The
rent would be the same, the difference is how it is utilized. There
is evidence that communities who raise their revenue from land,
rather than from labor and capital, are more prosperous, many
increasing productivity by more than 25%. ...
Cities which choose to collect
land rent as their primary source
of revenue have the advantage of not requiring burdensome taxes to be
paid by workers, businesspeople, entrepreneurs or citizens.
Individuals who work to create wealth should be allowed to keep what
they produce. When labor is not taxed, greater production and
consumption occurs. Investment capital is formed which is used to
produce more wealth. New jobs are created and economic diversity
results.... Read
the whole article
Tony Vickers: From Zee
to Vee: using property tax assessments to monitor the economic landscape
The ‘real world’ in which human
society exists is not
confined to natural, physical phenomena. From earliest times, human
beings have interacted socially and economically. As they do so, they
have specialised and traded in goods and services which are the
products of combinations of labour, capital, enterprise and the
fourth – often forgotten but distinct – factor of all production:
land.
Land comprises all natural
resources, not just ‘terra
firma.’ It is the universe minus man’s products. Even the
simplest of human activities, sleep, requires each of us to occupy
exclusively a space, a location, preferably a bed in a home of our
own. But that word ‘own’ conjures emotions and political
postures. ...
Rent will remain with
the owner unless and until recovered for
the community that created it, through taxation. On the other hand,
economies competing for the active agents of production –
capital and labour – are engaged in a ‘race to the
bottom’ of lower tax rates on corporations and high-paid
individuals. Governments wishing to invest in public services are
finding the most secure source of revenue is the property tax. And
within the range of possible property taxes, studies have shown that
cities
which shift taxes off buildings onto land values out-compete
those who do not
Distinguishing
land from buildings (Plassman & Tideman, 1999; Hartzok,
1997). ...
The Nobel-winning economist
William Vickrey said that the property
tax is actually two different taxes (Vickrey 1991). That is because
buildings are capital, not land, in the economic sense – even
if, in most legal codes, there is no distinction between land and
improvements made to it which are all lumped together as ‘landed
property’ or real estate. Buildings and other improvements to
land all depreciate over time unless further capital is expended.
Eventually the market value of such improvements may become
negative, owing to the costs that would need to be incurred by
someone wishing to redevelop the site for an alternative use. But
that does not necessarily take away the rental value of the
site.
Much urban blight is caused by
these so-called ‘brown
field’ vacant and under-used sites. However they are often in
valuable locations, with good transport connections. It may be that
owners are speculating that land prices will rise and enable them to
sell at greater profit in the future than now, or it may be that
there is genuinely no market for sites in a particular location
unless the cost of remediation is subsidised as a form of public
investment. Such investment, according to Vickrey and other followers
of Henry George, can be entirely funded from LVT. In a lecture given
in 1991, first published last year, Vickrey claimed:
“Cities have the
capacity to be fully self-financing without dependence on either
federal assistance or on general taxes that are unrelated to benefits
received.”
The proviso, according to Vickrey,
is to replace the tax on
buildings with a tax on land value alone – LVT:-
“The property tax
combines one of the best and one of the worst taxes we have. The
portion that falls on sites or land values is the only major tax that
is reasonably free of distortionary effects and is not intolerably
regressive”.
Taxing buildings and work done to
improve them discourages such
work. Un-taxing them and taxing land more highly, irrespective of its
actual state of development but based upon its highest and best
immediate potential use, will encourage owners to maintain their
sites and buildings in such a way as to maximise their income. A
remote site or one with conservation or other restrictions will have
a low site value, hence attract low taxes, whereas a high value city
centre derelict site will very soon be redeveloped. The extra
property tax revenue from extending the tax base to sites that are
currently under-taxed (because the tax is based primarily on
building/rental value not site/owner value), ensures public
infrastructure projects can be funded without resource to general
taxes or excessive borrowing on the financial markets. ... Read the whole article
Mason Gaffney: George's
Economics of Abundance: Replacing dismal choices with practical
resolutions and synergies
... Untaxing buildings obviously
draws in outside capital, which is
good locally, but is not capital formation to the whole economy. In
Keynesian models, higher income leads to higher saving, and does
create new capital. Supply-siders today worry more about raising the
rate of saving from any given income. In supply-side models it is
more important to increase the rate of saving, without depending
entirely on the Keynesian effect, where higher income raises saving.
Also, from the nationalist viewpoint, it is better to supply
investable funds from domestic savings, to minimize foreign
ownership.
Land taxation helps here, too.
Land taxation, if heavy enough to
count, lowers the investment value of land, through "tax
capitalization". There is a diminishing marginal utility of savings
to any wealth-holder, meaning the more you have, the less you need
more. With land devalued, those needing wealth seek substitute
assets to replace land in their portfolios. To acquire those
additional assets they must save more, and invest the savings in real
new capital, rather than land.
Thus, Georgist taxation meets the
proper goals of supply-side
economics: raising output, and raising saving. It reconciles
supply-side economics with taxation by providing a mode of taxation
that stimulates instead of dragging down production and employment.
10... read the whole article
Mason Gaffney: How to
Revive a Dying City
But we've always heard that tax
destroys incentives. The news in
Henry George is that we can tax all the rent out of land, and not one
square foot will walk away, nor will God switch off the Creation. Man
creates capital by saving; some Other Force created land, and
sustains and serves it every day, undeterred by taxes.
Nor will Georgist taxes leave
owners sulking on their land, but
the contrary. A 1983 Fortune magazine
article calls them "Higher
Taxes that Promote Development." The fixed tax is levied on land
value, based on opportunity cost. The owner uses land harder and
improves it more to meet a fixed tax; or sells, releasing surplus
land to those needing more space. Taxes stifle enterprise only if
they increase with enterprise. Land tax increases only with
opportunity cost, which is independent of the enterprise of the
owner. The only activity this tax impairs is withholding land from
use.
George's land tax promotes equity
toward the landless in at least
four ways:
- it relieves them of taxes, to the extent
that landowners
pay more;
- it supplies them with more goods and
services, as land is
used better;
- it offers them jobs producing those goods
and services;
and
- it offers them a better chance to acquire
land, as surpluses are
released to the market.
This is supply-side economics
with a kick. It works through tax
transformation rather than tax reduction; total tax revenue may rise
or fall, as a separate issue. We can raise taxes and stimulate supply
together; there is no hard choice between them. At the same time, it
is demand side economics: untaxing investment raises the marginal
after-tax return, which, to demand-siders, is the motor that drives
the macro-economy. George's program
not only reconciles efficiency
and equity, it squares taxes and incentives. What more can we ask of
economic policy than to resolve stand-offs that have confused us, and
dead-locked constructive action, for generations?
It is an achievement on a par with
resolving Evolution and
Creation, except George's program is something we can do something
about. We can implement it as quickly as we unclog the cerebral
arteries and follow thought with action.
Many
people are comforted to think
justice must be sacrificed for
efficiency, and schools starved or libraries closed to free up
incentives, so nothing, really, can ever be done. We all feel
compassion, but, to stay whole in this world of beggars and bandits,
learn to harden our hearts. We screen out evidence of injustice and
rationalize what we cannot deny. This mindset, while understandable,
is unaffordable in a period of dangerous national decline and of
growing division between haves and have-nots. Corking in feelings is
difficult; there is satisfaction in venting compassion via support of
constructive public policies.
Camden has the highest tax rate in
New Jersey, causing a vicious
circle as high rates drive away capital and further erode the tax
base. What if only land value were taxed? The depressant would become
a stimulant by the simple magic of converting a variable charge into
a fixed, unavoidable one. So it is with most depressed cities, which
today look vainly to Washington for salvation. They need enabling
legislation from their states, on the Pennsylvania model, but given
this power can save themselves. ... read the whole article
Mason Gaffney: The Taxable
Capacity of Land
The question I am assigned is
whether the taxable
capacity of land without buildings is up to the job of financing
cities, counties, and schools. Will the revenue be enough? The answer
is "yes."
The universal state and
local revenue problem today is
whether we must cap tax rates to avoid driving business away. It is
exemplified by Governor Pete Wilson of the suffering State of
California. He keeps repeating we
must make a hard choice: cut taxes
and public services, or drive out business and jobs. (When a public
figure gives you two choices you know they're both bad, and he wants
one of them.)
The unique, remarkable quality of
a property tax based on
land ex buildings is that you may raise the rate with no fear of
driving away business, construction, people, jobs, or capital! You
certainly will not drive away the land. However high the tax
rate,
not one square foot of it will put on a track shoe and hop out of
town. The only bad thing to say about this tax's incentive effects is
that it stimulates revitalization, and makes jobs. If some people
think that is bad, maybe this attitude is the problem. ...
The property tax,
rather than "shoot anything that
moves," is a charge on inactivity. It taxes both lands and
buildings on their market value, regardless of how they are used.
"Hold on," you might say, "how about the very activity of
constructing those buildings?" Yes, touché, the property tax
does shoot at that, and shoot hard. However, that is why we are here
today, to consider modifying the tax to exempt buildings. The
proposal is to make it a tax mainly, or even purely, on "land ex
buildings," a tax on inactivity, a tax just for sitting on a piece
carved from the world's fixed, limited land supply.
"Hold on again," I have
heard, "how much revenue can land
yield by itself?" It is my job to address that. I assure you it
can
yield more than local governments need. I have already pointed
out
you can raise the rate to any level without fear of driving away
jobs, capital, people, or building. That is a remarkable quality in a
tax, especially one as progressive as the land tax. I will also
support the point in several other ways.
The taxable capacity of
land is camouflaged in our times
by a consistent modern
tendency to underassess it, relative to
buildings. There are several studies in point. The most general
one
is the quinquennial Report of the U.S. Census of Governments. It
actually understates the tendency a lot, by omitting the class of
land most underassessed, that is, raw acreage in and near
cities. ...
Please understand, the
proposed tax change will not
produce an untempered rise of land prices. Taxing land at a higher
rate balances and offsets the effect of exempting buildings. It tends
to lower land prices, just as untaxing buildings tends to raise
them.
On balance, however, the positive effects on land prices will
outweigh the negative ones, because of the constructive incentive
effects of changing the tax base to land. Read on.
"What, then, will have
changed?", you might be asking. It's
a fair question. What's changed is
that your property tax is no
longer biased against renewal, against replacement of old by new.
Neither is it biased against full development of the economic
capacity of each site. All the ground rents that are now aborted by
deferral of renewal, and by underdevelopment, will be generated by
new, full development. Land prices, your new tax base, will be pushed
up just by the expectation of new buildings' being tax free. The mere
expectation will immediately boost the value of land, your new city
tax base, even before the new buildings go up. ...
"How about
corporate stock?", I hear. "Should we exempt
corporate wealth from the property tax?" Actually, almost all
jurisdictions already exempt stock and all other "intangible"
property. Not to worry, however, you tax corporate assets. When you
rank property owners by value of holdings, the top ten on most tax
rolls are all corporations. None of their multi-national
profit-shifting through layered ownership of foreign subs, and
creative transfer pricing, can hide their taxable property on your
assessor's maps. This makes sense anyway. Why should you think you
can tax a corporation for its business in Malaysia? What concerns you
is its property in your town. ...
"Corporate" is not
coterminous with "industrial," anyway.
Many corporations are in retailing. They own chain stores, malls,
gasoline stations, auto dealerships, major real estate
"developments," drive-ins, office space, department stores, banks,
"power centers," etc. As to these, shifting to the land basis will
shift more of the tax burden to them, because retailing has a higher
land fraction than any other major land use (except vacant, golf
courses, cemeteries, parking lots, etc.). That is because location
is more critical to retailers than other businesses. You can tell
this by their high rate of tear-downs and remodeling.
Among its other effects,
site-value taxation will induce
some land to shift from retail to industrial use. Recall that
exempting the building, or prospective building, lets buyers bid more
for land. The higher the building fraction, the stronger is that
force. Thus the present system, which is biased against buildings
generally, is biased against industrial compared with retail uses.
Removing that bias will help industry outbid retail for land -- not
all land, of course, but land on the tipping point between the uses.
Most towns today seem oversupplied with retailers, compared with
their shortage of basic industries. Shifting to the site-value basis
of property taxation helps redress that balance.
"Let the market decide,"
some say. "No good can come from
forcing land into use, against the owner's private judgment."
Actually, the proposal to exempt
buildings and focus property taxes
on site values is premised on the market concept of consumer
sovereignty; it's the present property tax that isn't. The case
may
be summed up like this: if the tax on a parcel varies with the use of
the parcel, then the tax biases choices against the use more
taxed. Economists call the land tax "neutral," for that very
reason: it does not vary with use. It does not bias the choice of
uses; the consumer sovereign prevails. "No other tax can make that
statement." ...
"Hold on once more," I hear,
"not so fast, how about the
mansions of rich people?" Another fair question: how, indeed, can
you justify exempting them from taxation? The answer may astonish
you. ...
... The relevant
rule we need here is just that people's house values are more alike
than their lot values. It is
lot value, more than house value, that
divides the rich from the poor.
- The average house
(ex
land) in the posh UEL jurisdiction
is worth 2.8 times the average
in the Victoria Rural jurisdiction
($173.1/$61.9).
- The average land parcel
(ex
building) in the UEL is
worth 17.5 times the average
in the Victoria Rural jurisdiction
($692.5/$39.6).
Now do us both a favor,
please. Pause and savor that
comparison. Let it linger, as though you were testing a slow sip of
wine from Fredonia's famous grapes. Roll it on your tongue, mull
sensually over its aroma and bouquet, and, getting back to business,
mull cerebrally over its full import. The house that shelters the
very rich family is worth 2.8 times the house of the modest family;
but the land under the house of the very rich is worth 17.5 times the
land of the modest. Seventeen and one half times as much! Again,
it is lot value, more than building value, that divides the rich from
the poor. Seldom
will you find an economic rule more strongly
supported by data. It's just a matter of presenting the data so as to
test and bring out the rule.
An American counterpart of
Vancouver's "University Endowment
Lands" is Beverly Hills, California, where land value composes
some 80% of residential values, and the mean parcel is worth
something like a million dollars. Beverly Hills, with its great
wealth and mansions, is known as "Tear-down City." Every year many a
grand old palace that once sheltered some renowned matinee idol, and
rang to scandalous parties, is torn down to salvage its site for the
next, grander one. In a land boom, such as crested in 1989, half the
city goes to the brink of demolition and replacement.
What do those data tell us?
The rich as a rule do not live
next to the poor. Rather, they cluster in neighborhoods with much
higher lot values. The poor seek shelter first, and go where it is
affordable. The rich put
a high premium on location,
neighborhood, views, and grounds, resulting in higher land fractions
in their real estate. Mansions are visible evidences of wealth,
impressing viewers powerfully; land values are invisible. The
perceptual bias is to underrate the invisible, if you are not
regularly in the real estate market. In the numbers, however, land
and buildings are equally visible, and their message is clear. It
is land value more than house value that divides the rich from the
poor. Ergo, a tax shift from buildings to land is a shift from the
poor to the rich, even though the houses of the rich are exempted. It
makes the property tax more progressive. ...
Making the property tax more
progressive is not just
equitable, it raises its revenue capacity. That is because visible
damage to the poor and marginal puts a cap on any tax. You can't
squeeze blood out of a turnip, and if you try you'll look like the
Sheriff of Nottingham. A land tax won't drive the poor from their
humble huts, because it exempts the huts, and the sites have low tax
valuations. It may tax a few off valuable land, if their poor huts
are there and they own the land. However, if they own such land, are
they really poor?
They may be "land-poor:" a
few folks always are. They have
non-cash assets, but are illiquid. "Illiquid" may be just a euphemism
for "holding out for more" -- there is always a market at a price.
Even so their plight, genuine or affected, traditionally evokes
sympathy and support. We must address it.
California, although
backward in many ways, has addressed it
effectively. In our special improvement districts (SIDs),
State law allows the SID to contract with the landowner as follows.
You don't have to pay your annual charge
in
cash. If
you choose not to, we take an equity in your property, charging a
modest rate of interest. Our equity accumulates over time. When you
die, we sell the property and take our share; your estate gets the
rest. Should our equity reach 100% during your lifetime, you stay
there for the duration, tax free.
Objectively, it looks like a
good deal for the taxpayer.
They can't come out behind, even if they die soon; if they live long,
they come out ahead. The instructive
result is that very few people
take this apparently advantageous option. UCLA's Donald Shoup
has
published several works on the program. One way or another, they
manage to pay on time. Perhaps it attracts the attention of potential
heirs, in a compelling way, but somehow the cash comes forth. While
intending only to relieve distress, the program seems to have called
a great bluff. The lachrymose plea of the cash-poor widow is
unanswerable in debate, without appearing callous, doctrinaire, and
jackbooted. Meantime wealthy interests, thoroughly undistressed, hide
behind the widow's skirt and get their way. ...
Another attractive
feature of land taxation is its
interesting positive effect on the economic base of a city. It
strengthens it by its tendency to hit absentee owners harder than
resident owners. The land fraction in real estate is generally
highest in the CBD of any city, so that is a favorite place for
absentees to buy and hold. They like the steady income, and the
"trophy" quality. The surplus in real estate is what attracts outside
buyers, and land is what yields the surplus. About 2/3 of downtown
Los Angeles is owned by non-resident aliens, for example. In a more
workaday city, Milwaukee, the absentee owners consist of former
residents, or their heirs, who grew too rich to abide the harsh
winters.
Consider the effect on your
balance of payments. When you
get more tax money from absentees, money that used to flow to Tehran,
Zurich, or Palm Beach now flows into your local treasury to pay your
local teachers and city workers, and relieve your builders and
building managers. In this way taxing land actually acts to undergird
the value of its own base.... Read
the whole article
Ted Gwartney: A Free
Market Strategy to Reduce Sprawl
- Unused land is far more abundant than we realize.
- End the Public Subsidy of Land Speculation and Sprawl
- Counterproductive growth limitations and regulations
should be abolished.
- A Strategy for Urban Renewal
- A Strategy for Economic Development
- Public Finance by Self-Financing
The property tax could be
shifted to reduce the incentives for
sprawl. If the property tax were taken off urban buildings and
focused on the land itself, this would penalize land speculation and
would reward people who build on their land. Thus land speculation,
which promotes a "leap frog" development out of the city and into the
surrounding countryside, would decrease. The proposed shift from
traditional property tax to a "land value tax" would penalize land
speculation and encourage urban redevelopment. Removing the tax on
buildings makes them cheaper to construct, renovate and operate, and
more affordable to buy or rent. Urban construction creates urban
jobs. Capital and labor both benefit. ...
One means that has long been available but not brought into
general use is to exempt buildings from the real estate tax and begin
to impose an annual tax on land sites that makes holding land off the
market for speculation a costly proposition. An annual fee on land
should be set near what the land site alone would yield if rented by
the owner to the highest bidder. Think of how this would change the
behavior of land owners. If I owned a parcel of land with a rental
value of $6,000 a year and that was near what the city charged me as
my annual fee, my return on investment as a land speculator would be
greatly reduced. In order to generate positive cash flow I would
either develop the land myself or put it on the market so that
someone else would develop it. At the same time, if my tax rate on
the building I constructed on the land was zero, my incentive is to
construct a building that maximizes my cash flow (i.e., to develop
the parcel to its highest and best use in the market). At minimum,
land prices would stabilize and the increase in land brought onto the
market would be somewhat offset by increased demand. Land prices to
builders would tend to begin to fall over time. ...
It was estimated that the BART
transportation system in San
Francisco produced two times more land value than it cost to build.
The public recaptured only a small part of the cost from benefits
provided by land taxes and user fees. Most of the cost came from
external sources, unrelated sales and income taxes. Most of the
profits went into only a few pockets.
Thus, the claim that a community
is short of capital is
misleading. In fact, a community could become self-sufficient in the
supply of capital from internal sources. But a precondition for this
is the reduction of taxes on productive capital and labor. Examine,
for example, what would happen as a result of the elimination of
taxation of buildings. This decision, not to penalize people who
invest their savings in new buildings, leads to the stimulation of a
higher level of national income, higher saving, and the creation of
new capital. According to the study made by Tideman and Plassmann
(1998, The Losses of Nations, Fred Harrison, editor, Orthila Press),
shifting taxes off buildings, production and distribution, and onto
land and natural resources, could increase the gross national product
by 25%, or one trillion 1998
dollars
($1,000,000,000,000). ... Read the
whole article
Bill Batt: The Nexus of
Transportation, Economic Rent, and Land Use
Consider now the tax on the
improvement portion of the property parcel.
Here, depending upon the slope of the supply curve and the demand
curve, the tax is likely to be passed forward to a greater or lesser
extent to the tenant. Very little of it in fact is typically borne by
the landlord. The existence of the tax on structures incurs a
depressing effect upon the rate of investment, just like all such taxes
with more than zero elasticity. And the greater scarcity of sites for
rent, either commercial or residential, has the impact of driving up
prices for their use. What is even more significant, as noted earlier,
is that the shift of taxes off improvements and onto landsites
encourages the use of those sites to the full extent of their
locational value, thereby halting and even reversing the centrifugal
forces of sprawl development. Greater investment in high value
landsites creates greater density and proximity in the community,
enhancing the accessibility of those sites to one another and reducing
the need for transportation mobility.... read
the whole article
Mason Gaffney: The Taxable Surplus
of Land: Measuring, Guarding and Gathering It
Taxing the Net
Product of Land Permits Untaxing Capital
The IMF, World Bank, and various U.S.
advisors tell you and the world that you must make a hard choice: you must cut
spending on social welfare, even on needed pensions and back wages, in order
to attract and retain capital. The supposed hard choice is false, and the advice
is bad.
When you tax Net
Land Revenue, as advised here, you are not taxing at all the investor who uses
his capital to improve land, or equip it with
machinery and stock it with goods. The landowner or manager gets to deduct
the User Cost of Capital from the tax base (as shown in Section
2). The improver gets to keep, free of tax, the entire increment in
production that his capital generates. Taxes are limited to the Net Product of
land, which you may even evaluate and tax prior to the owner's using the land
at all. In the acronyms of finance, the investor who applies real capital to
Russian land will get to keep the entire "Marginal Return" (MR) from the capital.
This MR after-tax (MRAT) will become the same as the MR before-tax (MRBT). Few
other nations can
offer such an attraction.
This change will reverse the capital flight you now suffer from, and help recall
over $100 billions of expatriate capital now stashed abroad. More, it will attract
foreign capital, whose supply is highly
elastic, into private ventures. Russia will
become like a "tax haven" for mobile capital (and all capital is mobile within
a few years). This will not be done clandestinely in the sometimes sinister
manner we associate with Cyprus, Switzerland, or Bermuda, but quite openly and
honestly. Russia will not, like the present tax havens of the world, serve merely
as a broker or transit station for capital headed elsewhere; Russia will be the
final
destination, to your great advantage.
Foreign capital will not come here primarily to buy Russian land and collect
Russian rents, for you will be taxing that land heavily. It will come primarily
to improve, stock and equip Russian land with new capital that you will NOT be
taxing.
Will the IMF object and make trouble for you? They should be happy to see their
loans used to create capital in Russia, and restructure your industries to earn
income to repay the loans. That is what they say they want, at
any rate, and this will be a good way to test their sincerity. If they do make
trouble, you need not care, for you will no longer need them: world capital will
be beating a path to your door.
The OECD will surely object, for they are waging a campaign to force all nations
to adopt the same kind of oppressive, biased, counterproductive tax systems they
use themselves. So far, however, they cannot even compel several small island
nations to bend to them, so I think giant Russia, with its proud sovereign traditions,
can resist. If you do exempt capital from taxation, as recommended here, and
begin to suck in significant amounts of capital from the whole world's pool,
your competition will alarm and embarrass many OECD and other nations, who may
be forced to follow suit. That, however, is a problem, if it is one, for a somewhat
speculative future. Your immediate problem and crisis calls for recalling $100
billions of your own expatriate capital, and few could object to, or feel threatened
by
that. ... read the whole article
Nic Tideman: Applications of
Land Value Taxation to Problems of Environmental Protection, Congestion,
Efficient Resource Use,
Population, and Economic Growth
Recognition of the equal rights of all to natural opportunities, through land
value taxation and its extension to charges for the use of other resources,
is not only just and efficient, but has the capacity to make a major contribution
to economic growth. This occurs
through a variety of paths.
The most important path is that public collection of the value of exclusive
use of natural opportunities provides revenue that makes it possible to remove
taxes from the earnings of labor and capital. When people are taxed less, they
earn more. Using data that emerged from changes in U.S. tax rates, Feldstein
has estimated that the elasticity of earnings with respect to the fraction
of income not taken at the margin by federal taxes is at least 1.0 (and more
for workers in higher tax brackets).6 When
the entity that removes a tax on labor is less than global, this action also
attract labor to the region.
When taxes are removed from capital, the effect is even more powerful, as
long as the entity removing the tax is less than global. Capital is extremely
mobile in response to regional changes in net returns. It is highly counterproductive
for any locality or nation to tax capital, because there will be virtually
no effect on the return to capital after taxes. Capital will merely be driven
from the taxed region until the return after taxes matches what can be obtained
elsewhere. If the whole world removes taxes from capital, the resulting increase
in the rate of return to capital will increase the rate of saving, but the
adjustment will occur over some years. ... read
the whole article
Bill Batt: The Fallacy of the "Three-Legged Stool" Metaphor
Tax experts, especially at the state level, ply their trade by invoking
one metaphor above all others: the three-legged stool. It rests on the claim
that a sound and successful tax regime for any government needs to rely on
a three tax bases: income, property and sales. This is repeated so
often that it passes today without much examination. ...
The power with which the three-legged
stool analogy has underpinned tax policy is in fact rather disconcerting,
because
a close examination of its premises shows that they are very questionable. These
benchmark measures of a tax regime are scrutinized here in order to
cast doubt on the claims so often made on their behalf. ...
If one realizes that houses, just like cars, refrigerators, computers and
other manufactured items, depreciate in value and that only Land increases
in market value due to the factors of inflation and rent accretion, it will
become clear that the remedy for onerous real estate taxes is downtaxing
buildings and uptaxing Land. The result of doing so will stabilize
tax burdens for those who otherwise resent their payment. In the unusual
cases, especially during transitions, when titleholders of limited income cannot
manage such obligations, taxes can easily be deferred until owners "cash out" by
selling or dying when such debts can be settled. Sales of appreciated
land typically provide estates with adequate wherewithal to both pay any back
taxes and give a capital gain too. And because business tenants continue
to pay the going market rate for office space, they too are in no way burdened
by any tax shifts.
The upshot is that a tax on Land value alone
-- totally neutral, efficient, certain, progressive, stable, and administrable
-- measures up so well that it looks like the perfect tax! It
is even argued that a land tax is "better
than neutral," in that it actually fosters the kind of economic activity that
fosters vibrant communities. ...
In the final analysis, studies show that
very few states measure up to the one-third -- one third -- one-third standard
in any case. Political and other factors aside, there are good
reasons for a state's not abiding by such rules. It is only due to
misunderstandings that faith in the big three taxes constituting the three-legged
stool have come to prevail. When these taxes are measured by
their conformity with the conventionally accepted principles of sound tax
theory, they appear wanting. By shifting to the collection of economic
rent, manifest mainly in the form of land value taxation, governments
will better succeed not only in overcoming the prevailing resentment
against current
taxation policies but provide better financial support for those services
which are the rightful province of public obligation. ... read
the whole article
Charles T. Root — Not a Single Tax! (1925)
Briefly defined the land value or economic rent of any piece of ground is
the largest annual amount voluntarily offered for the exclusive use of that
ground, or of an equivalent parcel, independent of improvements thereon. Every
holder or user of land pays economic rent, but he now pays most of it to the
wrong party. The aggregate economic rent of the territory occupied by any political
unit is, as has been stated above, always sufficient, usually more than sufficient,
for the legitimate expenses of the government of that unit. As also stated
above, the economic rent belongs to the community, and not to individual landowners.
On the other hand, the result of every utilization or enhancement of the
natural advantages of land (such as farm profits, the rent and selling value
of buildings
and other improvements), when accomplished by an individual, belongs wholly
to that individual, and should never, and need never, be taken from him
by taxation. ...
But again the voice of the objector is heard, possibly to this effect: "This
plan may be all right for the community, but how about poor Mr. Rhinelastor?"
In reality the landowner would not suffer so much from the restoration of
the public revenue as might at first appear. For one thing, whereas he is now
taxed, at least in theory, not only on land, but on buildings, cash, bonds,
and all other personal property, and perhaps on his income as well, he would
then have no taxes at all to pay. Furthermore the economic rent is not the
full measure of the possible earning capacity of the land, but will always
be less than the offerer expects to make out of its use.
Again, while it must be firmly insisted that the economic rent is the rightful
property of the community and not of the landowner, the community would probably
never take it all. Communal ownership of land is not desirable, even if it
were practicable. Individual ownership and management are best, and it is not
at all improper for the community to allow the owner something for caring for
the land to which he holds title, and for collecting and transmitting to the
treasury the economic rent.
But — and right here is one of the prime advantages of the abolition
of taxation — Mr. Rhinelastor, in order to get satisfactory return
from his land, must improve it. Unless he is satisfied with a small income
from
it, to wit, the proportion of the economic rent which the community chooses
to leave in his hands, he must put upon his land the best building the
location will warrant. The rents of this building will be his in their
entirety, not
one dollar of them being taken from him by taxation. If he is not prepared
or not willing to do this he would probably find it more profitable, before
he leaves the country, to sell the land to some one of the many persons
who are eager to build upon it. It will always be salable, although not
by any
means at present figures.
Now imagine for a moment the effect upon the appearance of a city and upon
the comfort of its population which would result from the change of fiscal
policy which this article proposes. At present, a tempting premium is placed
upon keeping land unimproved or inadequately improved, while a heavy penalty
is imposed upon improvement. Most land appreciates constantly. All buildings
depreciate from the moment of completion. Yet the building is taxed equally
with the land.
What incentive does such a system offer the speculative landowner to put up
a commodious, well-lighted modern structure in place of the old ruin which
now pays him so well? The old one cannot depreciate much more, and while paying
a trifling tax because of its physical worthlessness, he is thereby enabled
to collect and pocket the economic rent of the ground, which the community
is continually rendering more valuable. The new building would absorb a large
amount of capital, would begin to run down even before it could be occupied,
and would be taxed to the limit. Why then is not the landlord justified in
letting well enough alone, enjoying the growing economic rent, and waiting
till he can get a fancy price for the right to collect it?
But reverse the conditions. Reclaim for the community its natural income,
making it expensive either to keep needed land vacant or to withhold it from
the ready and willing to improve it to the full extent of its possibilities.
Does it require severe intellectual effort to foresee the results? Better
and better houses, apartments, tenements, offices and stores, more employment
for labor in all enterprises now held back by the shadow of the tax-gatherer,
an end of all tax-lying, tax-evasion and tax-injustice, and withal, a public
revenue adequate to all real public needs.
What a contrast to the existing plan of pouring public money into the laps
of individual landowners ... read the whole article
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