Postage
Stamp Pricing
Mason Gaffney: Economics in
Support of Environmentalism
Sprawl is not
the product of free choice
A favorite fallacy is that sprawl results from free individual
choice. In fact, sprawl results
mainly from subsidies to sprawl,
enforced through taxation and/or utility rate regulation. Thus it is
imposed, not freely chosen. The classic case, which exemplifies
the
whole genus, is postal service. It costs you 29¢ to send a
letter across the street downtown, or from rural Idaho to rural
Florida. The generic name for such subsidies to sprawl is
"postage-stamp pricing" (a
species of spatial cross-subsidy), which
gives you the idea.
In British Columbia, people move
around a good deal by car-ferry,
because of the terrain. The Provincial Government ("The Crown
Provincial") runs the system. There are many lovely little islands in
the Straits of Georgia, between Vancouver Island and the mainland,
favored by the wealthy, the exclusive and reclusive. Being more
sybaritic than Henry D. Thoreau, and politically puissant, they have
demanded and received car-ferry service. This service costs about $10
for every $1 in revenue. The resulting deficit is covered by raising
rates on the main plebeian line, Victoria-Vancouver. Naturally, these
cheap ferries attract new visitors to the islands, and new demand for
land there. ... read the whole article
Mason Gaffney: How to
Revive a Dying City
"French Equity"
(Equity in Kind)
Under the Code Napoleon, a French testator must divide real estate
equally among all children. Money cannot substitute for land; the
Code requires equity in kind. The resulting fine subdivision is
called morcellement, and the
Code demands it without regard for
efficiency.
Each heir, in fact, must get an equal share of land of each
quality: meadow, woodland, etc.
Today we approach French Equity indirectly, and expensively. We
distribute land haphazardly, but seek to make every parcel equally
good by extending utilities and roads to all parcels on the same
terms, regardless of cost or location.
Economists call such schemes "postage stamp pricing," because
postal rates do not vary with delivery costs. Manhattan has 64,000
residents per square mile; Montana has 5.4. It costs a lot more to
collect or deliver mail in Montana. The reason postal rates rise is
that the U.S. urban population is spreading out more like Montana and
less like Manhattan (which once had over 100,000 per square mile).
Here are five other examples:
- The British Columbia Ferry Service. This socialized
system has two urban lines that make money, but the whole system
hardly breaks even, because lesser lines serve remote areas. The
worst costs $12 for every dollar of revenue.
- British Columbia Hydro. This socialized power
system
charges uniform rates throughout the Province. Users living in
high-density Vancouver are cheap to serve. A few live on the Yukon
border, where (I surmise) it costs hundreds of dollars to earn a
dollar of revenue.
- Water and sewer service in Milwaukee County,
Wisconsin. City investments have been captured, controlled,
and milked by suburban land development interests, helped by state
legislators.
- State university campuses. The legislative ethic
demands a prize, such as a university campus, in every electoral
district. Most of the eight UC campuses have excess land; some have
excess floor space. Sacramento solves rising enrollment not with more
intensive use of existing campuses, but with the costly creation of
new ones, each to enrich influential land speculators.
- Water supply in California. The high real cost of
serving new settlements is passed on to older settled areas through
an accounting device called "melding," stirring
all the accounts in the same pot. Melding passes through several levels:
a state
wholesaler serves the metropolitan district, which serves local
districts, which serve cities. At the end of the line, in Riverside,
it costs society $1800 to serve the marginal acre-foot (a unit of
water) selling for $20. This subsidy is worth fortunes to developers;
the cost is spread so others won't notice.
Problems with French
Equity
There are two problems with these subsidies as an approach to
equity: they are not equitable, and they are wasteful.
- Equity
achieved by regional cross-subsidy is not interpersonal, but
interregional. It is like U.S. "foreign aid" programs, which tax the
poor in rich countries to aid the rich in poor countries. Some
who
hold speculative land and enjoy subsidies are among the world's
richest people and cor-porations. Equity is not served by milking
middle-class neighborhoods to further enrich wealthy owners. "Public
works for private gain" is bad enough, but worse when profiteers are
already rich.
- How about waste? Subsidy
creates waste in the amount of the
subsidy, almost by definition. The New York Regional Plan
Association
estimates the social cost of creating a new lot on the urban fringe
at four times the lot's price (probably an underestimate). Why
develop a lot worth only one quarter of its cost? Because other
people pay the other three quarters. This process transfers ground
rent from areas of overcharge to areas of undercharge, but it
destroys much of the ground rent. To spread the surplus, we lose much
of it.
Has French Equity any merit? It passed for a way to create jobs
when Keynes actually urged waste as a route to full employment. Those
ideas are now dormant, but we still do not understand the problem. If
we had to fire teachers or policemen each time a city extended
utilities to a campaign donor's raw acres, we would better sense the
true cost of public works for private profit.
... read the whole article
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