The first deduction he makes from this "first principle" is the
equal right to life and personal liberty, and the second, the equal right to
the use of the earth.
This first deduction he treats briefly in Chapter VIII, "The Rights
of Life and Personal Liberty," saying, "These are such evident corollaries
from our first principle as scarcely to need a separate statement."
The second deduction, only next in importance to the rights to life and personal
liberty, and indeed involved in them, he treats at length in a chapter which
I give in full:
Chapter IX — The Right to the Use of the Earth
§ 1. Given a race of beings having like claims to
pursue the objects of their desires; given a world adapted to the gratification
of those desires — a
world into which such beings are similarly born — and it unavoidably
follows that they have equal rights to the use of this world. For if each
of them "has
freedom to do all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom
of any other," then each of them is free to use the earth for the satisfaction
of his wants, provided he allows all others the same liberty. And conversely,
it is manifest that no one, or part of them, may use the earth in such a
way as to prevent the rest from similarly using it; seeing that to do this
is to
assume greater freedom than the rest, and consequently to break the law.
§ 2. Equity, therefore, does not permit property in
land. For if one portion of the earth's surface may justly become the possession
of an individual
and may be held by him for his sole use and benefit as a thing to which he
has an exclusive right, then other portions of the earth's surface may be
so held; and eventually the whole of the earth's surface may be so held,
and our
planet may thus lapse altogether into private hands. Observe now the dilemma
to which this leads. Supposing the entire habitable globe to be so enclosed,
it follows that if the landowners have a valid right to its surface, all
who are not landowners have no right at all to its surface. Hence, such
can exist
on the earth by sufferance only. They are all trespassers. Save by the permission
of the lords of the soil, they can have no room for the soles of their feet.
Nay, should the others think fit to deny them a resting place, these landless
men might equitably be expelled from the earth altogether. If, then, the
assumption that land can be held as property involves that the whole globe
may become
the private domain of a part of its inhabitants; and if, by consequence,
the rest of its inhabitants can then exercise their faculties – can
then exist even – only by consent of the landowners, it is manifest
that an exclusive possession of the soil necessitates an infringement of
the law of equal freedom.
For men who cannot "live and move and have their being" without
the leave of others cannot be equally free with those others.
§ 3. Passing from the consideration of the possible
to that of the actual, we find yet further reason to deny the rectitude
of property in land. It can
never be pretended that the existing titles to such property are legitimate.
Should anyone think so, let him look in the chronicles. Violence, fraud,
the prerogative of force, the claims of superior cunning – these
are the sources to which those titles may be traced. The original deeds
were
written
with the
sword rather than with the pen: not lawyers, but soldiers, were the conveyancers;
blows were the current coin given in payment; and for seals, blood was used
in preference to wax. Could valid claims be thus constituted? Hardly. And
if not, what becomes of the pretensions of all subsequent holders of estates
so
obtained? Does sale or bequest generate a right where it did not previously
exist? Would the original claimants be nonsuited at the bar of reason because
the thing stolen from them had changed hands? Certainly not. And if one act
of transfer can give no title, can many? No; though nothing be multiplied
forever, it will not produce one. Even the law recognizes this principle.
An existing
holder must, if called upon, substantiate the claims of those from whom he
purchased or inherited his property; and any flaw in the original parchment,
even though the property should have had a score of intermediate owners,
quashes his right.
"But Time," say some, "is a great legalizer.
Immemorial possession must be taken to constitute a legitimate claim. That
which has been held from
age to age as private property, and has been bought and sold as such, must
now be considered as irrevocably belonging to individuals." To which
proposition a willing assent shall be given when its propounders can assign
it a definite
meaning. To do this, however, they must find satisfactory answers to such
questions as: How long does it take for what was originally a wrong to grow
into a right?
At what rate per annum do invalid claims become valid? If a title gets perfect
in a thousand years, how much more than perfect will it be in two thousand
years? – and so forth. For the solution of which they will require
a new calculus.
Whether it may be expedient to admit claims of certain standing is not the
point. We have here nothing to do with considerations of conventional privilege
or legislative convenience. We have simply to inquire what is the verdict given
by pure equity in the matter. And this verdict enjoins a protest against every
existing pretension to the individual possession of the soil, and dictates
the assertion that the right of mankind at large to the earth's surface is
still valid, all deeds, customs, and laws notwithstanding.
§ 4. Not only have present land tenures an indefensible
origin, but it is impossible to discover any mode in which land can become
private
property. Cultivation is commonly considered to give a legitimate title.
He who has reclaimed
a tract of land from its primitive wildness is supposed to have thereby
made it his own. But if his right is disputed, by what system of logic can
he vindicate
it? Let us listen a moment to his pleadings.
"Hallo, you, sir," cries the cosmopolite to some backwoodsman smoking
at the door of his shanty, "by what authority do you take possession
of these acres that you have cleared, round which you have put up a snake
fence
and on which you have built this log house?"
"By what authority? I squatted here because there
was no one to say nay – because I was as much at liberty to do so
as any other man. Besides, now that I have cut down the wood and plowed
and cropped the ground, this
farm is more mine than yours or anybody's, and I mean to keep it."
"Ay, so you all say. But I do not yet see how you
have substantiated your claim. When you came here you found the land producing
trees – sugar
maples, perhaps; or maybe it was covered with prairie grass and wild strawberries.
Well, instead of these you made it yield wheat, or maize, or tobacco. Now
I want to understand how, by exterminating one set of plants and making the
soil
bear another set in their place, you have constituted yourself lord of this
soil for all succeeding time."
"Oh, those natural products which I destroyed were
of little or no use; whereas I caused the earth to bring forth things good
for food – things
that help to give life and happiness."
"Still you have not shown why such a process makes
the portion of earth you have so modified yours. What is it that you have
done? You have
turned
over the soil to a few inches in depth with a spade or a plow; you have
scattered over this prepared surface a few seeds; and you have gathered the
fruits which
the sun, rain, and air helped the soil to produce. Just tell me, if you
please, by what magic have these acts made you sole owner of that vast mass
of matter,
having for its base the surface of your estate and for its apex the center
of the globe? All of which it appears you would monopolize to yourself
and your descendants forever."
"Well, if it isn't mine, whose is it? I have dispossessed
nobody. When I crossed the Mississippi yonder I found nothing but the silent
woods. If someone
else had settled here and made this clearing, he would have had as good a
right to the location as I have. I have done nothing but what any other
person was
at liberty to do had he come before me. While they were unreclaimed, these
lands belonged to all men – as much to one as to another – and
they are now mine simply because I was the first to discover and improve
them."
"You say truly when you say that 'while they were
unreclaimed these lands belonged to all men.' And it is my duty to tell
you that they belong
to all men still, and that your 'improvements,' as you call them, cannot
vitiate the claim of all men. You may plow and harrow, and sow and reap;
you may turn
over the soil as often as you like; but all your manipulations will fail
to make that soil yours, which was not yours to begin with. Let me put
a case.
Suppose now that in the course of your wanderings you come upon an empty
house, which in spite of its dilapidated state takes your fancy; suppose
that with
the intention of making it your abode you expend much time and trouble in
repairing it – that you paint and paper and whitewash, and at considerable
cost bring it into a habitable state. Suppose further that on some fatal
day a
stranger
is announced who turns out to be the heir to whom this house has been bequeathed,
and that this professed heir is prepared with all the necessary proofs of
his identity; what becomes of your improvements? Do they give you a valid
title
to the house? Do they quash the title of the original claimant?"
"No."
"Neither, then, do your pioneering operations give
you a valid title to this land. Neither do they quash the title of its
original claimants – the
human race. The world is God's bequest to mankind. All men are joint heirs
to it; you among the number. And because you have taken up your residence
on a certain part of it and have subdued, cultivated, beautified that part – improved
it, as you say – you are not therefore warranted in appropriating it
as entirely private property. At least if you do so, you may at any moment
be
justly expelled by the lawful owner – Society."
"Well, but surely you would not eject me without making
some recompense for the great additional value I have given to this tract,
by reducing
what was a wilderness into fertile fields. You would not turn me adrift and
deprive
me of all the benefit of those years of toil it has cost me to bring this
spot into its present state."
"Of course not; just as in the case of the house,
you would have an equitable title to compensation from the proprietor for
repairs and new
fittings, so the community cannot justly take possession of this estate without
paying
for all that you have done to it. This extra worth which your labor has
imparted to it is fairly yours; and although you have, without leave, busied
yourself
in bettering what belongs to the community, yet no doubt the community
will duly discharge your claim. But admitting this is quite a different thing
from
recognizing your right to the land itself. It may be true that you are
entitled to compensation for the improvements this enclosure has received
at your hands;
and at the same time it may be equally true that no act, form, proceeding,
or ceremony can make this enclosure your private property."
§ 5. It does indeed at first sight seem possible for the earth to become
the exclusive possession of individuals by some process of equitable distribution. "Why," it
may be asked, "should not men agree to a fair subdivision? If all are
co-heirs, why may not the estate be equally apportioned and each be afterward
perfect master of his own share?"
To this question it may in the first place be replied that
such a division is vetoed by the difficulty of fixing the values of respective
tracts of
land. Variations in productiveness, different degrees of accessibility, advantages
of climate, proximity to the centers of civilization – these and
other such considerations remove the problem out of the sphere of mere
mensuration
into the region of impossibility.
But, waiving this, let us inquire who are to be the allottees.
Shall adult males and all who have reached twenty-one on a specified day
be the fortunate
individuals? If so, what is to be done with those who come of age on the
morrow? Is it proposed that each man, woman, and child shall have a section?
If so,
what becomes of all who are to be born next year? And what will be the fate
of those whose fathers sell their estates and squander the proceeds? These
portionless ones must constitute a class already described as having no right
to a resting place on earth – as living by the sufferance of their
fellow men – as being practically serfs. And the existence of such
a class is wholly at variance with the law of equal freedom.
Until, therefore, we can produce a valid commission authorizing us to make
this distribution, until it can be proved that God has given one charter of
privileges to one generation and another to the next, until we can demonstrate
that men born after a certain date are doomed to slavery, we must consider
that no such allotment is permissible.
§ 6. Probably some will regard the difficulties inseparable
from individual ownership of the soil as caused by pushing to excess a
doctrine applicable
only within rational limits. This is a very favorite style of thinking with
some. There are people who hate anything in the shape of exact conclusions,
and these are of them. According to such, the right is never in either extreme,
but always halfway between the extremes. They are continually trying to reconcile
Yes and No. Ifs and buts and excepts are their delight. They have so great
a faith in "the judicious mean" that they would scarcely believe
an oracle if it uttered a full-length principle. Were you to inquire of them
whether the earth turns on its axis from east to west or from west to east,
you might almost expect the reply, "A little of both," or "Not
exactly either." It is doubtful whether they would assent to the axiom
that the whole is greater than its part, without making some qualification.
They have a passion for compromises. To meet their taste, Truth must always
be spiced with a little Error. They cannot conceive of a pure, definite,
entire, and unlimited law. And hence, in discussions like the present, they
are constantly
petitioning for limitations – always wishing to Abate and modify and
moderate – ever
protesting against doctrines being pursued to their ultimate consequences.
But it behooves such to recollect that ethical truth is as exact and as peremptory
as physical truth, and that in this matter of land tenure the verdict of morality
must be distinctly yea or nay. Either men have a right to make the soil private
property or they have not. There is no medium. We must choose one of the two
positions. There can be no half-and-half opinion. In the nature of things the
fact must be either one way or the other.
If men have not such a right, we are at once delivered
from the several predicaments already pointed out. If they have such a
right, then is that
right absolute,
sacred, not on any pretense to be violated. If they have such a right, then
is his Grace of Leeds justified in warning off tourists from Ben Mac Dhui,
the Duke of Atholl in closing Glen Tilt, the Duke of Buccleugh in denying
sites to the Free Church, and the Duke of Sutherland in banishing the Highlanders
to make room for sheep walks. If they have such a right, then it would be
proper
for the sole proprietor of any kingdom – a Jersey or Guernsey, for
example to impose just what regulations he might choose on its inhabitants – to
tell them that they should not live on his property unless they professed
a certain religion, spoke a particular language, paid him a specified reverence,
adopted an authorized dress, and conformed to all other conditions he might
see fit to make. If they have such a right, then is there truth in that tenet
of the ultra-Tory school, that the landowners are the only legitimate rulers
of a country – that the people at large remain in it only by the landowner's
permission and ought consequently to submit to the landowners' rule and respect
whatever institutions the landowners set up. There is no escape from these
inferences. They are necessary corollaries to the theory that the earth can
become individual property. And they can be repudiated only by denying that
theory.
§ 7. After all, nobody does implicitly believe in
landlordism. We hear of estates being held under the king – that
is, the State – or of their
being kept in trust for the public benefit; and not that they are the inalienable
possessions of their nominal owners. Moreover, we daily deny landlordism
by our legislation. Is a canal, a railway, or a turnpike road to be made,
we do
not scruple to seize just as many acres as may be requisite, allowing the
holders compensation for the capital invested. We do not wait for consent.
An act of
Parliament supersedes the authority of title deeds and serves proprietors
with notices to quit, whether they will or not. Either this is equitable
or it is
not. Either the public are free to resume as much of the earth's surface
as they think fit, or the titles of the landowners must be considered absolute,
and all national works must be postponed until lords and squires please to
part with the requisite slices of their estates. If we decide that the claims
of individual ownership must give way, then we imply that the right of the
nation at large to the soil is supreme; that the right of private possession
exists only by general consent; that general consent being withdrawn, it
ceases – or,
in other words, that it is no right at all.
§ 8. "But to what does this doctrine, that men
are equally entitled to the use of the earth, lead? Must we return to the
times of unenclosed wilds
and subsist on roots, berries, and game? Or are we to be left to the management
of Messrs. Fourrier, Owen, Louis Blanc, and Co.?" Neither. Such a doctrine
is consistent with the highest state of civilization; may be carried out
without involving a community of goods; and need cause no very serious revolution
in
existing arrangements. The change required would simply be a change of landlords.
Separate ownerships would merge into the joint-stock ownership of the public.
Instead of being in the possession of individuals, the country would be held
by the great corporate body – Society. Instead of leasing his acres
from an isolated proprietor, the farmer would lease them from the nation.
Instead
of paying his rent to the agent of Sir John or His Grace, he would pay it
to an agent or deputy agent of the community. Stewards would be public officials
instead of private ones, and tenancy the only land tenure.
A state of things so ordered would be in perfect harmony
with the moral law. Under it all men would be equally landlords; all men
would be alike
free to
become tenants. A, B, C, and the rest might compete for a vacant farm as
now, and one of them might take that farm, without in any way violating the
principles
of pure equity. All would be equally free to bid; all would be equally free
to refrain. And when the farm had been let to A, B, or C, all parties would
have done that which they willed – the one in choosing to pay a given
sum to his fellow men for the use of certain lands–the others in refusing
to pay that sum. Clearly, therefore, on such a system, the earth might be
enclosed, occupied, and cultivated in entire subordination to the law of
equal freedom.
§ 9. No doubt great difficulties must attend the resumption,
by mankind at large, of their rights to the soil. The question of compensation
to existing
proprietors is a complicated one – one that perhaps cannot be settled
in a strictly equitable manner. Had we to deal with the parties who originally
robbed the human race of its heritage, we might make short work of the matter.
But, unfortunately, most of our present landowners are men who have, either
mediately or immediately – either by their own acts or by the acts
of their ancestors – given for their estates equivalents of honestly
earned wealth, believing that they were investing their savings in a legitimate
manner.
To estimate justly and liquidate the claims of such is one of the most intricate
problems society will one day have to solve. But with this perplexity and
our
extrication from it, abstract morality has no concern. Men, having got themselves
into the dilemma by disobedience to the law, must get out of it as well as
they can, and with as little injury to the landed class as may be.
Meanwhile, we shall do well to recollect that there are
others besides the landed class to be considered. In our tender regard
for the vested interests
of the few, let us not forget that the rights of the many are in abeyance,
and must remain so, as long as the earth is monopolized by individuals. Let
us remember, too, that the injustice thus inflicted on the mass of mankind
is an injustice of the gravest nature. The fact that it is not so regarded
proves nothing. In early phases of civilization even homicide is thought
lightly
of. The suttees of India, together with the practice elsewhere followed of
sacrificing a hecatomb of human victims at the burial of a chief, shows this;
and probably cannibals consider the slaughter of those whom "the fortune
of war" has made their prisoners perfectly justifiable. It was once
also universally supposed that slavery was a natural and quite legitimate
institution – a
condition into which some were born and to which they ought to submit as
to a Divine ordination; nay, indeed, a great proportion of mankind hold this
opinion
still. A higher social development, however, has generated in us a better
faith, and we now to a considerable extent recognize the claims of humanity.
But our
civilization is only initial. It may by and by be perceived that Equity utters
dictates to which we have not yet listened; and men may then learn that to
deprive others of their rights to the use of the earth is to commit a crime
inferior only in wickedness to the crime of taking away their lives or personal
liberties.
§ 10. Briefly reviewing the argument, we see that
the right of each man to the use of the earth, limited only by the like
rights of his fellow
men, is immediately deducible from the law of equal freedom. We see that
the maintenance of this right necessarily forbids private property in land.
On
examination, all existing titles to such property turn out to be invalid;
those founded on reclamation, inclusive. It appears that not even an apportionment
of the earth among its inhabitants could generate a legitimate proprietorship.
We find that if pushed to its ultimate consequences a claim to exclusive
possession
of the soil involves a landowning despotism. We further find that such
a claim is constantly denied by the enactments of our legislature. And we
find lastly
that the theory of the co-heirship of all men to the soil is consistent
with the highest civilization, and that, however difficult it may be to embody
that
theory in fact, Equity sternly commands it to be done.